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Abstract: In this paper, we propose a novel equilibrium solution notion for the time-inconsistent stochas-
tic linear-quadratic optimal control problem. This notion is called the mixed equilibrium solution, which
consists of two parts: a pure-feedback-strategy part and an open-loop-control part. When the pure-feedback-
strategy part is zero or the open-loop-control part does not depend on the initial state, the mixed equilibrium
solution reduces to the open-loop equilibrium control and the feedback equilibrium strategy, respectively.
Using a maximum-principle-like methodology with forward-backward stochastic difference equations, a nec-
essary and sufficient condition is established to characterize the existence of a mixed equilibrium solution.
Then, by decoupling the forward-backward stochastic difference equations, three sets of difference equations,
which together portray the existence of a mixed equilibrium solution, are obtained. Moreover, the case with
a fixed time-state initial pair and the case with all the initial pairs are separately investigated. Furthermore,
an example is constructed to show that the mixed equilibrium solution exists for all the initial pairs, although
neither the open-loop equilibrium control nor the feedback equilibrium strategy exists for some initial pairs.
Key words: time inconsistency, stochastic linear-quadratic optimal control, mean-field optimal control,
forward-backward stochastic difference equation, equilibrium solution.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider a class of mean-field stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ, for short) control problems.
The system dynamics are described by the following discrete-time stochastic difference equation (S∆E, for
short) 
Xtk+1 =
(
At,kX
t
k + A¯t,kEtX
t
k +Bt,kuk + B¯t,kEtuk + ft,k
)
+
∑p
i=1
(
Cit,kX
t
k + C¯
i
t,kEtX
t
k +D
i
t,kuk + D¯
i
t,kEtuk + d
i
t,k
)
wik,
Xtt = x, k ∈ Tt, t ∈ T,
(1.1)
where T = {0, . . . , N − 1}, Tt = {t, · · · , N − 1} and At,k, A¯t,k, Cit,k, C¯
i
t,k ∈ R
n×n, Bt,k, B¯t,k, D
i
t,k, D¯
i
t,k ∈
Rn×m, ft,k, d
i
t,k ∈ R
n are deterministic matrices, and {Xtk, k ∈ T˜t} , X
t and {uk, k ∈ Tt} , u with
T˜t = {t, 1, ..., N} are the state process and control process, respectively. The noise {wk, k ∈ T} is assumed
to be a vector-valued martingale difference sequence defined on a probability space (Ω,F , P ) with
Ek[wk] = 0, Ek[(wk)
2] = ∆k, k ∈ T, (1.2)
∗This work is supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (61227902, 11471242, 61773222),
the National Key Basic Research Program (973 Program) of China (2014CB845301), Hong Kong RGC grants 15224215 and
15255416.
†College of Artificial Intelligence, Nankai University, Tianjin 300350, P.R. China. Email: yhni@nankai.edu.cn.
‡Department of Applied Mathematics, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Kowloon, Hong Kong, P.R. China. Email:
malixun@polyu.edu.hk.
§Key Laboratory of Systems and Control, Institute of Systems Science, Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science,
Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190; School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,
Beijing 100049, P.R. China. Email: jif@iss.ac.cn.
¶Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, University of California, San Diego, USA. Email: krstic@ucsd.edu.
1
where ∆k = (δ
ij
k )p×p, k ∈ T, are assumed to be deterministic. Et[ · ] in (1.1) denotes the conditional
mathematical expectation E[ · |Ft], where Ft is defined as σ{wl, l = 0, 1, · · · , t− 1} and F0 is understood as
{∅,Ω}, and Ek[ · ] in (1.2) is similarly defined. In (1.1), x belongs to l2F(t;R
n), which is defined as
{
ζ ∈ Rn
∣∣
ζ is Ft-measurable, E|ζ|2 <∞
}
. We introduce the cost function
J(t, x;u) =
N−1∑
k=t
Et
{
(Xtk)
TQt,kX
t
k + (EtX
t
k)
T Q¯t,kEtX
t
k + u
T
kRt,kuk + (Etuk)
T R¯t,kEtuk
+ 2qTt,kX
t
k + 2ρ
T
t,kuk
}
+ Et
[
(XtN )
TGtX
t
N
]
+ (EtX
t
N)
T G¯tEtX
t
N + 2(Ftx+ gt)
T
EtX
t
N , (1.3)
where Qt,k, Q¯t,k, Rt,k, R¯t,k, k ∈ Tt, Gt, G¯t are deterministic symmetric matrices of appropriate dimensions,
and qt,k, ρt,k, k ∈ Tt, gt are deterministic vectors. Let
l2F (Tt;R
m) =
{
ν = {νk, k ∈ Tt}
∣∣ νk is Fk-measurable,E|νk|2 <∞, k ∈ Tt}.
Then, we pose the following optimal control problem.
Problem (LQ). For the time-state initial pair (t, x), find u∗ ∈ l2F (Tt;R
m) such that
J(t, x;u∗) = inf
u∈l2
F
(Tt;Rm)
J(t, x;u).
Compared with the standard stochastic LQ problems, Problem (LQ) has three unconventional features.
First, the cost weighting and system matrices depend explicitly on the initial time t. Second, the term
2(Ftx+ gt)
TEtX
t
N makes J(t, x;u) a state-dependent (or rank-dependent) utility. Third, J(t, x;u) contains
nonlinear terms of the conditional expectation of state and control. These three features are deeply rooted in
the fields of economics and finance. The first feature is an abstraction of the general discounting functions;
see [4, 14] for examples of hyperbolic discounting and quasi-geometric discounting. The second feature
is of rank-dependent utility [5], and a notable example of the third feature is the mean-variance utility
[2, 4, 6, 8, 16, 17]. It is known that any of the three features will ruin the time consistency of the optimal
control, namely, Bellman’s principle of optimality will no longer work for Problem (LQ).
Problems with the nonlinear term of the conditional expectation (in the cost functional) are classified as
mean-field stochastic optimal control problems [31]. Realizing the time inconsistency (called nonseparability
there), Li and Ng [16] used an embedding scheme to derive the optimal policy for the multi-period mean-
variance portfolio selection. Note that the optimal policy of [16] is with respect to the initial pair, that is, it
is an optimal policy only when viewed at the initial time. This derivation is now called the pre-committed
optimal solution. However, we find that a pre-committed optimal control (with respect to an initial pair)
will no longer serve as an optimal control for an intertemporal initial pair. Although the pre-committed
optimal solution is of some practical and theoretical value, it neglects and does not fully address the time
inconsistency. Another approach is to handle the time inconsistency in a dynamic manner, by seeking time-
consistent equilibrium solutions instead of a pre-committed optimal control; this has mainly been motivated
by practical applications in economics and finance, and has recently attracted considerable research interest.
The qualitative analysis of time inconsistency can be traced back to the ideas of the father of free
market economics and moral philosopher Adam Smith [23]. In 1955, Strotz [24] gave the first quantitative
formulation of time inconsistency and studied the general discounting problem. His approach successfully
tackled time inconsistency using a lead-follower game with a hierarchical structure. Inspired by Strotz,
hundreds of works have sought to tackle practical problems in economics and finance by focusing on the
time inconsistency of dynamic systems described by ordinary difference or differential equations; see, for
example, [9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 21] and the references therein. Unfortunately, as Ekeland [9, 10] pointed out,
it is hard to prove the existence of Strotz’s equilibrium policy. Therefore, it is necessary and of great
importance to develop a general theory of time-inconsistent control. In recent years, this topic has attracted
considerable attention from the theoretical control community; see, for example, [4, 12, 13, 25, 27, 29, 31]
and the references therein.
With respect to the time-inconsistent LQ problems, two kinds of time-consistent equilibrium solutions
have been investigated, namely, the open-loop equilibrium control and the closed-loop equilibrium strategy
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[12, 13, 27, 29, 31]. The two formulations are investigated separately because in dynamic game theory, open-
loop control differs significantly from the closed-loop strategy [3, 30]. To compare, the aim of open-loop
formulation is to find an open-loop equilibrium “control,” while the “strategy” is the object of closed-loop
formulation. Yong further developed Strotz’s equilibrium solution [24], which is essentially a closed-loop
equilibrium strategy, into the LQ optimal control [27, 31] and the nonlinear optimal control [29, 28, 26]. The
open-loop equilibrium control has been extensively studied by Hu-Jin-Zhou [12, 13], Yong [31], Ni-Zhang-
Krstic [18], and Qi-Zhang[22]. In particularly, the closed-loop formulation can be viewed as an extension of
Bellman’s dynamic programming, and the corresponding equilibrium strategy (if it exists) is constructed by
a backward procedure [27, 28, 29, 31]. Differently, the open-loop equilibrium control is characterized via a
maximum-principle-like methodology [12, 13, 18].
It is well known that the aim of portfolio selection is to seek the best allocation of wealth among a basket
of securities. The (single-period) mean-variance formulation initiated by Markowitz [17] is the cornerstone
of modern portfolio theory and is widely used in both academic studies and the financial industry. The
multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection is the natural extension of [17], which has been extensively
studied. Li-Ng [16] and Zhou-Li [32] were the first to report the analytical pre-commitment optimal policies
for the discrete-time case and the continuous-time case, respectively. In fact, the multi-period mean-variance
portfolio selection problem, which is a particular example of time-inconsistent problem, stimulated the recent
developments in time-inconsistent problems and the revisits to multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection
[2, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13].
In this paper, we examine the aforementioned Problem (LQ). In Section 2, we introduce the mixed
equilibrium solution to Problem (LQ). The solution contains two different parts: a pure-feedback-strategy
part and an open-loop-control part. By letting the open-loop-control part be independent of the initial state
or the pure-feedback-strategy part be zero, the corresponding mixed equilibrium solution is reduced to a
linear feedback equilibrium strategy and open-loop equilibrium control, respectively. Section 3 characterizes
the mixed equilibrium solution using a maximum-principle-like methodology with convexity, stationarity, and
forward-backward stochastic difference equations (FBS∆Es). It is shown that the convexity and stationarity
conditions can be equivalently characterized via solutions to three sets of difference equations. Based on
the results for the mixed equilibrium solution, we then obtain the results for the open-loop equilibrium
control and linear feedback equilibrium strategy (with respect to a fixed initial pair). For the case with all
the initial pairs, conditions in terms of solvability of three sets of difference equations are given to ensure
the existence of mixed equilibrium solution. These conditions are necessary and sufficient to determine the
open-loop equilibrium control and linear feedback equilibrium strategy. Interestingly, for all of the initial
pairs, the existence of general feedback equilibrium strategy is shown to be equivalent to the existence of
linear feedback equilibrium strategy, which can be obtained by a backward procedure. Furthermore, the
backward procedure works only when the feedback equilibrium strategy exists for all of the initial pairs, and
cannot be applied to the case where we know only of the existence of a feedback equilibrium strategy for
a fixed initial pair. Section 4 gives an example to illustrate the developed theory. Finally, in Section 5, we
discuss future topics that are worth investigating.
This paper makes the following novelties.
• Most of the existing results for time-inconsistent LQ problems are for the continuous-time case [12, 13,
26, 27, 29, 31]. The discrete-time multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection problem is a notable
example of Problem (LQ), and its investigation calls for the development of general theory of discrete-
time time-inconsistent LQ optimal control. Furthermore, the model and methodology developed in
this paper are more general than those in [18].
• The notion of mixed equilibrium solution is introduced, and it seems that no similar notion has been
reported for time-inconsistent optimal control. Necessary and sufficient conditions are established to
characterize a pair of pure-feedback strategy and open-loop control as a mixed equilibrium solution (for
a time-state initial pair). Using the notion of mixed equilibrium solution, the conditions to equivalently
ensure the existence of an open-loop equilibrium control and a linear feedback equilibrium strategy
can be simultaneously obtained. In other words, we can investigate the two equilibrium solutions in a
unified way.
3
Importantly, the mixed equilibrium solution is not a hollow concept. In Section 4, it is shown that
neither the open-loop equilibrium control nor the feedback equilibrium strategy exists for the initial
pair (t, x) with t = 0, 1 and x ∈ l2F(t;R
2), although we are able to construct 10 mixed equilibrium
solutions. Therefore, it is necessary to study the mixed equilibrium solution, which gives us more
flexibility to deal with the time-inconsistent optimal control.
The work of [19] serves as a companion to this paper in terms of testing our developed theory and pursuing
the solvability of the multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection problem. The non-degenerate assumption
was removed in [19], which is popular in the literature on multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection.
Neat conditions have been obtained in [19] to characterize the existence of the equilibrium solutions. To
emphasize the dependence on the initial pair, Problem (LQ) for the initial pair (t, x) is denoted as Problem
(LQ)tx throughout this paper. Furthermore, for notational simplicity, we denote in this paper
At,k = At,k + A¯t,k, Bt,k = Bt,k + B¯t,k, C
i
t,k = C
i
t,k + C¯
i
t,k, D
i
t,k = D
i
t,k + D¯
i
t,k,
Qt,k = Qt,k + Q¯t,k, Rt,k = Rt,k + R¯t,k, Gt = Gt + G¯t, t ∈ T, k ∈ Tt.
2 Mixed equilibrium solution
Before introducing the mixed equilibrium solution, we give the definition of feedback equilibrium strategy.
By a strategy, we mean a decision rule that a controller uses to select a control action based on the available
information set. Mathematically, a strategy is a mapping or an operator defined on the information set.
Substituting the available information into a strategy, we obtain the open-loop value or realization of this
strategy.
Definition 2.1. i). At stage k ∈ Tt, a function fk(·) is called an admissible feedback strategy (or simply
a feedback strategy) at k if for ζ ∈ l2F(k;R
n), fk(ζ) ∈ l2F(k;R
m). The set of this type of feedback strategies is
denoted by Fk, and Ft × · · · × FN−1 is denoted by FTt .
ii). Let f = (ft, ..., fN−1) ∈ FTt . For k ∈ Tt and ζ ∈ l
2
F(k;R
n), fk(ζ) can be divided into two parts,
namely, fk(ζ) = f
c
k + f
p
k (ζ), where f
c
k = fk(0) is the inhomogeneous part and the remainder f
p
k (·) is the
pure-feedback-strategy part of fk. Furthermore, (f
p
t , ..., f
p
N−1) is called a pure-feedback strategy.
Definition 2.2. i). A strategy ψ ∈ FTt is called a feedback equilibrium strategy of Problem (LQ)t,x, if
the following two points hold:
a) ψ does not depend on x;
b) For any k ∈ Tt and any uk ∈ l2F(k;R
m), it holds that
J
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ; (ψ ·X
k,ψ)|Tk
)
≤ J
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ; (uk, (ψ ·X
k,uk,ψ)|Tk+1)
)
. (2.1)
In (2.1), (ψ ·Xk,ψ)|Tk and (ψ ·X
k,uk,ψ)|Tk+1 (with Tk = {k, ..., N − 1},Tk+1 = {k+ 1, ..., N − 1}) are
given by
(ψ ·Xk,ψ)|Tk =
(
ψk(X
k,ψ
k ), ..., ψN−1(X
k,ψ
N−1)
)
,
(ψ ·Xk,uk,ψ)|Tk+1 =
(
ψk+1(X
k,uk,ψ
k+1 ), ..., ψN−1(X
k,uk,ψ
N−1 )
)
,
where Xk,ψ, Xk,uk,ψ are as follows
X
k,ψ
ℓ+1 = Ak,ℓX
k,ψ
ℓ +Bk,ℓψℓ(X
k,ψ
ℓ ) + A¯k,ℓEkX
k,ψ
ℓ + B¯k,ℓEkψℓ(X
k,ψ
ℓ ) + fk,ℓ
+
∑p
i=1
[
Cik,ℓX
k,ψ
ℓ +D
i
k,ℓψℓ(X
k,ψ
ℓ ) + C¯
i
k,ℓEkX
k,ψ
ℓ + D¯
i
k,ℓEkψℓ(X
k,ψ
ℓ ) + d
i
k,ℓ
]
wiℓ,
X
k,ψ
k = X
t,x,∗
k , ℓ ∈ Tk,
(2.2)

X
k,uk,ψ
ℓ+1 = Ak,ℓX
k,uk,ψ
ℓ +Bk,ℓψℓ(X
k,uk,ψ
ℓ ) + A¯k,ℓEkX
k,uk,ψ
ℓ + B¯k,ℓEkψℓ(X
k,uk,ψ
ℓ ) + fk,ℓ
+
∑p
i=1
[
Cik,ℓX
k,uk,ψ
ℓ +D
i
k,ℓψℓ(X
k,uk,ψ
ℓ ) + C¯
i
k,ℓEkX
k,uk,ψ
ℓ
+ D¯ik,ℓEkψℓ(X
k,uk,ψ
ℓ ) + d
i
k,ℓ
]
wiℓ,
X
k,uk,ψ
k+1 =
[
Ak,kX
k,uk,ψ
k + Bk,kuk + fk,k
]
+
∑p
i=1
[
Cik,kX
k,uk,ψ
k +D
i
k,kuk + d
i
k,k
]
wik,
X
k,uk,ψ
k = X
t,x,∗
k , ℓ ∈ Tk+1.
(2.3)
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Furthermore, in (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3), Xt,x,∗k is computed via{
X
t,x,∗
k+1 =
[
Ak,kX
t,x,∗
k + Bk,kψk(X
t,x,∗
k ) + fk,k
]
+
∑p
i=1
[
Cik,kX
t,x,∗
k +D
i
k,kψk(X
t,x,∗
k ) + d
i
k,k
]
wik,
X
t,x,∗
t = x, k ∈ Tt.
ii). Let (Ψ, γ) ∈ l2(Tt;Rm×n)× l2F(Tt;R
m) with
l2(Tt;R
m×n) =
{
ν = {νk, k ∈ Tt}
∣∣∣vk ∈ Rm×n is deterministic, |νk|2 <∞, k ∈ Tt}.
If Ψ and γ do not depend on x, and ψ of i) is equal to (Ψ, γ), namely, ψk(ξ) = Ψkξ+γk, k ∈ Tt, ξ ∈ l2F(k;R
n),
then (Ψ, γ) is called a linear feedback equilibrium strategy of Problem (LQ)tx.
Definition 2.3. A control ut,x ∈ l2F (Tt;R
m) is called an open-loop equilibrium control of Problem (LQ)tx,
if
J
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ;u
t,x|Tk
)
≤ J
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ; (uk, u
t,x|Tk+1)
)
(2.4)
holds for any k ∈ Tt and any uk ∈ l
2
F(k;R
m). Here, ut,x|Tk and u
t,x|Tk+1 are the restrictions of u
t,x on Tk
and Tk+1, respectively; and X
t,x,∗
k is computed via{
X
t,x,∗
k+1 =
[
Ak,kX
t,x,∗
k + Bk,ku
t,x
k + fk,k
]
+
∑p
i=1
[
Cik,kX
t,x,∗
k +D
i
k,ku
t,x
k + d
i
k,k
]
wik,
X
t,x,∗
t = x, k ∈ Tt.
Definition 2.4. i). A pair (Φ, vt,x) ∈ l2(Tt;Rm×n) × l2F(Tt;R
m) is called a mixed equilibrium solution
of Problem (LQ)tx, if the following two points hold:
a) Φ does not depend on x, and vt,x depends on x;
b) For any k ∈ Tt and any uk ∈ l2F(k;R
m), it holds that
J
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ; (Φ ·X
k,Φ + vt,x)|Tk
)
≤ J
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ; (uk, (Φ ·X
k,uk,Φ + vt,x)|Tk+1)
)
. (2.5)
In (2.5), (Φ ·Xk,Φ + vt,x)|Tk and (Φ ·X
k,uk,Φ + vt,x)|Tk+1 are given, respectively, by(
ΦkX
k,Φ
k + v
t,x
k , · · · ,ΦN−1X
k,Φ
N−1 + v
t,x
N−1
)
,(
Φk+1X
k,uk,Φ
k+1 + v
t,x
k+1, · · · ,ΦN−1X
k,uk,Φ
N−1 + v
t,x
N−1
)
,
where Xk,Φ, Xk,uk,Φ are defined by
X
k,Φ
ℓ+1 =
[(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)
X
k,Φ
ℓ +
(
A¯k,ℓ + B¯k,ℓΦℓ
)
EkX
k,Φ
ℓ +Bk,ℓv
t,x
ℓ + B¯k,ℓEkv
t,x
ℓ + fk,ℓ
]
+
∑p
i=1
[(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)
X
k,Φ
ℓ +
(
C¯ik,ℓ + D¯
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)
EkX
k,Φ
ℓ
+Dik,ℓv
t,x
ℓ + D¯
i
k,ℓEkv
t,x
ℓ + d
i
k,ℓ
]
wiℓ,
X
k,Φ
k = X
t,x,∗
k , k ∈ Tt, ℓ ∈ Tk,
(2.6)

X
k,uk,Φ
ℓ+1 =
[(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)
X
k,uk,Φ
ℓ +
(
A¯k,ℓ + B¯k,ℓΦℓ
)
EkX
k,uk,Φ
ℓ
+Bk,ℓv
t,x
ℓ + B¯k,ℓEkv
t,x
ℓ + fk,ℓ
]
+
∑p
i=1
[(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)
X
k,uk,Φ
ℓ +
(
C¯ik,ℓ + D¯
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)
EkX
k,uk,Φ
ℓ
+Dik,ℓv
t,x
ℓ + D¯
i
k,ℓEkv
t,x
ℓ + d
i
k,ℓ
]
wiℓ,
X
k,uk,Φ
k+1 =
[
Ak,kX
k,uk,Φ
k + Bk,kuk + fk,k
]
+
∑p
i=1
[
Cik,kX
k,uk,Φ
k +D
i
k,kuk + d
i
k,k
]
wik,
X
k,uk,Φ
k = X
t,x,∗
k , ℓ ∈ Tk+1.
(2.7)
The state Xt,x,∗k in (2.5), (2.6), and (2.7) is computed via
X
t,x,∗
k+1 =
[(
Ak,k + Bk,kΦk
)
X
t,x,∗
k + Bk,kv
t,x
k + fk,k
]
+
∑p
i=1
[(
Cik,k +D
i
k,kΦk
)
X
t,x,∗
k +D
i
k,kv
t,x
k + d
i
k,k
]
wik,
X
t,x,∗
t = x, k ∈ Tt.
(2.8)
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ii). Φ and vt,x in i) are, respectively, the pure-feedback-strategy part and the open-loop-control part of the
mixed equilibrium solution (Φ, vt,x).
iii). Letting Φ = 0 in i), the corresponding vt,x satisfying (2.5), denoted as v̂t,x, is then an open-loop
equilibrium control of Problem (LQ)tx.
iv). If vt,x of i) happens not to depend on x and denote such vt,x as v, then the corresponding (Φ, v)
is a linear feedback equilibrium strategy of Problem (LQ)tx. Here, l
2(Tt;R
m) =
{
ν = {νk, k ∈ Tt}
∣∣ |νk|2 <
∞, k ∈ Tt
}
.
Remark 2.5. By the definition, a mixed equilibrium solution (Φ, vt,x) is time consistent along Xt,x,∗,
namely, for any k ∈ Tt, (Φ, vt,x)|Tk is a mixed equilibrium solution for the initial pair (k,X
t,x,∗
k ). Noting
(Φ ·Xk,Φ + vt,x)|Tk =
(
ΦkX
k,Φ
k + v
t,x
k , (Φ ·X
k,Φ + vt,x)|Tk+1
)
, (uk, (Φ ·Xk,ut,Φ + vt,x)|Tk+1)
)
is obtained by
replacing ΦkX
k,Φ
k + v
t,x
k and X
k,Φ of (Φ · Xk,Φ + vt,x)|Tk with uk and X
k,uk,Φ, respectively. Furthermore,
note that the vt,x’s on both sides of (2.5) are the same. This is why we call Φ the pure-feedback-strategy part
and vt,x the open-loop-control part.
3 Characterization of the mixed equilibrium solution
3.1 The case with the fixed time-state initial pair (t, x)
The following lemma describes the cost difference formula under control perturbation.
Lemma 3.1. Let u¯k ∈ l2F(k;R
m) and λ ∈ R. Then, we have
J
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ; (ΦkX¯
k,u¯k,λ
k + v
t,x
k + λu¯k, (Φ · X¯
k,u¯k,λ + vt,x)|Tk+1)
)
− J
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ; (Φ ·X
k,Φ + vt,x)|Tk
)
= 2λ
[
Rk,k(ΦkX
k,Φ
k + v
t,x
k ) + B
T
k,kEkY
k,Φ
k+1 +
p∑
i=1
(Dik,k)
T
Ek(Y
k,Φ
k+1w
i
k) + ρk,k
]T
u¯k + λ
2J˜(k, 0; u¯k), (3.1)
where
J˜(k, 0; u¯k) =
N−1∑
ℓ=k
Ek
[
(αk,u¯kℓ )
T
(
Qk,ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ Rk,ℓΦℓ
)
α
k,u¯k
ℓ + (Ekα
k,u¯k
ℓ )
T
(
Q¯k,ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ R¯k,ℓΦℓ
)
Ekα
k,u¯k
ℓ
]
+ Ek
[
u¯TkRk,ku¯k
]
+ Ek
[
(αk,u¯kN )
TGkα
k,u¯k
N
]
+ (Ekα
k,u¯k
N )
T G¯kEkα
k,u¯k
N , (3.2)
and X¯k,u¯k,λ, αk,u¯k , Y k,Φ are given, respectively, by the S∆Es
X¯
k,u¯k,λ
ℓ+1 =
[(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)
X¯
k,u¯k,λ
ℓ +
(
A¯k,ℓ + B¯k,ℓΦℓ
)
EkX¯
k,u¯k,λ
ℓ
+Bk,ℓv
t,x
ℓ + B¯k,ℓEkv
t,x
ℓ + fk,ℓ
]
+
∑p
i=1
[(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)
X¯
k,u¯k,λ
ℓ +
(
C¯ik,ℓ + D¯
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)
EkX¯
k,u¯k,λ
ℓ
+Dik,ℓv
t,x
ℓ + D¯
i
k,ℓEkv
t,x
ℓ + d
i
k,ℓ
]
wiℓ,
X¯
k,u¯k,λ
k+1 =
[(
Ak,k + Bk,kΦk
)
X¯
k,u¯k,λ
k + Bk,kv
t,x
k + λBk,ku¯k + fk,k
]
+
∑p
i=1
[(
Cik,k +D
i
k,kΦk
)
X¯
k,u¯k,λ
k +D
i
k,kv
t,x
k + λD
i
k,ku¯k + d
i
k,k
]
wik,
X¯
k,u¯k,λ
k = X
t,x,∗
k , ℓ ∈ Tk+1,
(3.3)

α
k,u¯k
ℓ+1 =
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)
α
k,u¯k
ℓ +
(
A¯k,ℓ + B¯k,ℓΦℓ
)
Ekα
k,u¯k
ℓ
+
∑p
i=1
[(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)
α
k,u¯k
ℓ +
(
C¯ik,ℓ + D¯
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)
Ekα
k,u¯k
ℓ
]
wiℓ,
α
k,u¯k
k+1 = Bk,ku¯k +
∑p
i=1D
i
k,ku¯kw
i
k,
α
k,u¯k
k = 0, ℓ ∈ Tk+1,
(3.4)
and the backward stochastic difference equation (BS∆E, for short)
Y
k,Φ
ℓ =
[
Qk,ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ Rk,ℓΦℓ
]
X
k,Φ
ℓ +
[
Q¯k,ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ R¯k,ℓΦℓ
]
EkX
k,Φ
ℓ
+ (Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ)
TEℓY
k,Φ
ℓ+1 + (A¯k,ℓ + B¯k,ℓΦℓ)
TEkY
k,Φ
ℓ+1
+
∑p
i=1
[
(Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ)
TEℓ(Y
k,Φ
ℓ+1w
i
ℓ) + (C¯
i
k,ℓ + D¯
i
k,ℓΦℓ)Ek(Y
k,Φ
ℓ+1w
i
ℓ)
]
+ΦTℓ Rk,ℓv
t,x
ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ R¯k,ℓEkv
t,x
ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ ρk,ℓ + qk,ℓ,
Y
k,Φ
N = GkX
k,Φ
N + G¯kEkX
k,Φ
N + FkX
t,x,∗
k + gk, ℓ ∈ Tk.
(3.5)
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Proof. See Appendix A. 
Theorem 3.2. The following statements are equivalent:
i) Problem (LQ)tx admits a mixed equilibrium solution.
ii) There exists a pair (Φ, vt,x) ∈ l2(Tt;Rm×n)× l2F(Tt;R
m) such that the stationary condition
0 = Rk,k(ΦkX
k,Φ
k + v
t,x
k ) + B
T
k,kEkY
k,Φ
k+1 +
p∑
i=1
(Dik,k)
T
Ek
(
Y
k,Φ
k+1w
i
k
)
+ ρk,k, k ∈ Tt (3.6)
and the convexity condition
inf
u¯k∈l
2
F
(k;Rm)
J˜(k, 0; u¯k) ≥ 0, k ∈ Tt (3.7)
hold. Here, Y k,Φk+1 is computed via the following FBS∆E
X
k,Φ
ℓ+1 =
[(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)
X
k,Φ
ℓ +
(
A¯k,ℓ + B¯k,ℓΦℓ
)
EkX
k,Φ
ℓ +Bk,ℓv
t,x
ℓ + B¯k,ℓEkv
k,x
ℓ + fk,ℓ
]
+
∑p
i=1
[(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)
X
k,Φ
ℓ +
(
C¯ik,ℓ + D¯
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)
EkX
k,Φ
ℓ
+Dik,ℓv
t,x
ℓ + D¯
i
k,ℓEkv
k,x
ℓ + d
i
k,ℓ
]
wiℓ,
Y
k,Φ
ℓ = Qk,ℓX
k,Φ
ℓ + Q¯k,ℓEkX
k,Φ
ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ Rk,ℓΦℓX
k,Φ
ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ R¯k,ℓΦℓEkX
k,Φ
ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ Rk,ℓv
t,x
ℓ
+ΦTℓ R¯k,ℓEkv
t,x
ℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T
EℓY
k,Φ
ℓ+1 +
(
A¯k,ℓ + B¯k,ℓΦℓ
)T
EkY
k,Φ
ℓ+1
+
∑p
i=1
[(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Eℓ
(
Y
k,Φ
ℓ+1w
i
ℓ
)
+
(
C¯ik,ℓ + D¯
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Ek
(
Y
k,Φ
ℓ+1w
i
ℓ
)]
+ΦTℓ ρk,ℓ + qk,ℓ,
X
k,Φ
k = X
t,x,∗
k , Y
k,Φ
N = GkX
k,Φ
N + G¯kEkX
k,Φ
N + FkX
t,x,∗
k + gk, ℓ ∈ Tk,
(3.8)
and J˜(k, 0; u¯k) is given in (3.2). In (3.8), X
t,x,∗
k is computed via
X
t,x,∗
k+1 =
[(
Ak,k + Bk,kΦk
)
X
t,x,∗
k + Bk,kv
t,x
k + fk,k
]
+
∑p
i=1
[(
Cik,k +D
i
k,kΦk
)
X
t,x,∗
k +D
i
k,kv
t,x
k + d
i
k,k
]
wik,
X
t,x,∗
t = x, k ∈ Tt.
Furthermore, under any of the above conditions, (Φ, vt,x) given in ii) is a mixed equilibrium solution of
Problem (LQ)tx.
Proof. This follows from the definition and Lemma 3.1. 
To proceed, we first study the expression of Y k,Φ of (3.8) under some additional condition.
Lemma 3.3. If for k ∈ Tt, v
t,x
k = ΓkX
t,x,∗
k + v¯
t,x
k with Γk, v¯
t,x
k being deterministic, then the backward
state Y k,Φ of (3.8) has the following expression:
Y
k,Φ
ℓ = Sk,ℓX
k,Φ
ℓ + S¯k,ℓEkX
k,Φ
ℓ + Tk,ℓX
t,x,∗
ℓ + T¯k,ℓEkX
t,x,∗
ℓ + Uk,ℓX
t,x,∗
k + πk,ℓ, ℓ ∈ Tk, k ∈ Tt,
where 
Sk,ℓ = Qk,ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ Rk,ℓΦℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1
(
C
j
k,ℓ +D
j
k,ℓΦℓ
)
,
S¯k,ℓ = Q¯k,ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ R¯k,ℓΦℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T [
Sk,ℓ+1(A¯k,ℓ + B¯k,ℓΦℓ)
+ S¯k,ℓ+1(Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦℓ)
]
+
(
A¯k,ℓ + B¯k,ℓΦℓ
)T
(Sk,ℓ+1 + S¯k,ℓ+1)(Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦℓ)
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
[(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1(C¯
j
k,ℓ + D¯
j
k,ℓΦℓ)
+
(
C¯ik,ℓ + D¯
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1(C
j
k,ℓ +D
j
k,ℓΦℓ)
]
,
Sk,N = Gk, S¯k,N = G¯k, ℓ ∈ Tk,
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
Tk,ℓ =
{
ΦTℓ Rk,ℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1Bk,ℓ +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1D
j
k,ℓ
}
Γℓ
+
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T
Tk,ℓ+1
(
Aℓ,ℓ + Bℓ,ℓΦℓ + Bℓ,ℓΓℓ
)
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Tk,ℓ+1
(
Cjℓ,ℓ +D
j
ℓ,ℓΦℓ +D
j
ℓ,ℓΓℓ
)
,
T¯k,ℓ =
{
ΦTℓ R¯k,ℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T (
Sk,ℓ+1B¯k,ℓ + S¯k,ℓ+1Bk,ℓ
)
+
(
A¯k,ℓ + B¯k,ℓΦℓ
)T
×
(
Sk,ℓ+1 + S¯k,ℓ+1
)
Bk,ℓ +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
[(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1D¯
j
k,ℓ
+
(
C¯ik,ℓ + D¯
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
SkD
j
k,ℓ
]}
Γℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T
T¯k,ℓ+1
(
Aℓ,ℓ + Bℓ,ℓΦℓ + Bℓ,ℓΓℓ
)
+
(
A¯k,ℓ + B¯k,ℓΦℓ
)T (
Tk,ℓ+1 + T¯k,ℓ+1
)(
Aℓ,ℓ + Bℓ,ℓΦℓ + Bℓ,ℓΓℓ
)
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
(
C¯ik,ℓ + D¯
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Tk,ℓ+1
(
Cjℓ,ℓ +D
j
ℓ,ℓΦℓ +D
j
ℓ,ℓΓℓ
)
Tk,N = 0, T¯k,N = 0, ℓ ∈ Tk,
{
Uk,ℓ = (Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦℓ)Uk,ℓ+1,
Uk,N = Fk, ℓ ∈ Tk,
and 
πk,ℓ = βk,ℓv¯
t,x
ℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T (
(Sk,ℓ+1 + S¯k,ℓ+1)fk,ℓ + πk,ℓ+1
)
+
(
Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T (
Tk,ℓ+1 + T¯k,ℓ+1
)
fℓ,ℓ +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
[(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1d
j
k,ℓ
+
(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Tk,ℓ+1d
j
ℓ,ℓ
]
+ΦTℓ ρk,ℓ + qk,ℓ,
πk,N = gk, ℓ ∈ Tk
with
βk,ℓ = Φ
T
ℓ Rk,ℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T [
(Sk,ℓ+1 + S¯k,ℓ+1)Bk,ℓ + (Tk,ℓ+1 + T¯k,ℓ+1)Bℓ,ℓ
]
+
∑p
i,j=1
(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T [
Sk,ℓ+1D
j
k,ℓ + Tk,ℓ+1D
j
ℓ,ℓ
]
, ℓ ∈ Tk.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
For a matrix M ∈ Rn×m, let M † be its Moore-Penrose inverse. Then, we have the following lemma [1].
Lemma 3.4. Let matrices L, M , and N be given with appropriate size. Then, LXM = N has a
solution X if and only if LL†NMM † = N . Moreover, the solution of LXM = N can be expressed as
X = L†NM † + V − L†LVMM †, where V is a matrix with appropriate size.
If M = I in Lemma 3.4, then LL†N = N is equivalent to Ran(N) ⊂ Ran(L). Here, Ran(N) is the range
of N . The following theorem is concerned with the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a
mixed equilibrium solution.
Theorem 3.5. The following statements are equivalent:
i) Problem (LQ)tx admits a mixed equilibrium solution.
ii) There exists Φ ∈ l2(Tt;Rm×n) such that the following assertions hold.
a) The coupled equations

Sk,ℓ = Qk,ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ Rk,ℓΦℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1
(
C
j
k,ℓ +D
j
k,ℓΦℓ
)
,
Sk,ℓ = Qk,ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ Rk,ℓΦℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1(Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦℓ)
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1(C
j
k,ℓ +D
j
k,ℓΦℓ),
Sk,N = Gk, Sk,N = Gk + G¯k, ℓ ∈ Tk,
Ok = Rk,k + B
T
k,kSk,k+1Bk,k +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
k (D
i
k,k)
TSk,k+1D
j
k,k  0, k ∈ Tt
(3.9)
are solvable in the sense of Ok  0, k ∈ Tt, namely, Ok, k ∈ Tt, are all nonnegative definite.
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b) The condition
LkX
t,x,∗
k + θk ∈ Ran
(
Ok
)
, k ∈ Tt (3.10)
is satisfied. Here, Xt,x,∗ is computed via
X
t,x,∗
k+1 =
[(
Ak,k − Bk,kO
†
kLk
)
X
t,x,∗
k − Bk,kO
†
kθk + fk,k
]
+
∑p
i=1
[(
Cik,k −D
i
k,kO
†
kLk
)
X
t,x,∗
k −D
i
k,kO
†
kθk + d
i
k,k
]
wik,
X
t,x,∗
t = x, k ∈ Tt,
and Ok,Lk, θk, k ∈ Tt are given by
Ok = Rk,k + BTk,k
(
Sk,k+1 + Tk,k+1
)
Bk,k +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
k (D
i
k,k)
T
(
Sk,k+1 + Tk,k+1
)
Djk,k,
Lk = BTk,k
(
Sk,k+1 + Tk,k+1
)
Ak,k +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
k (D
i
k,k)
T
(
Sk,k+1 + Tk,k+1
)
Cjk,k
+ BTk,kUk,k+1,
θk = BTk,k
(
Sk,k+1 + Tk,k+1
)
fk,k +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
k (D
i
k,k)
T
(
Sk,+1 + Tk,k+1
)
d
j
k,k
+ BTk,kπk,k+1 + ρk,k,
k ∈ Tt,
where 
Tk,ℓ =
{
ΦTℓ Rk,ℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1Bk,ℓ
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1D
j
k,ℓ
}
Γℓ
+
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T
Tk,ℓ+1
(
Aℓ,ℓ + Bℓ,ℓΦℓ + Bℓ,ℓΓℓ
)
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Tk,ℓ+1
(
Cjℓ,ℓ +D
j
ℓ,ℓΦℓ +D
j
ℓ,ℓΓℓ
)
,
Tk,ℓ =
{
ΦTℓ Rk,ℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1Bk,ℓ
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1D
j
k,ℓ
}
Γℓ
+
(
Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T
Tk,ℓ+1
(
Aℓ,ℓ + Bℓ,ℓΦℓ + Bℓ,ℓΓℓ
)
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Tk,ℓ+1
(
Cjℓ,ℓ +D
j
ℓ,ℓΦℓ +D
j
ℓ,ℓΓℓ
)
Tk,N = 0, Tk,N = 0, ℓ ∈ Tk, k ∈ Tt,
{
Uk,ℓ = (Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦℓ)Uk,ℓ+1,
Uk,N = Fk, ℓ ∈ Tk, k ∈ Tt,
and 
πk,ℓ = −βk,ℓO
†
ℓθℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T (
Sk,ℓ+1fk,ℓ + πk,ℓ+1
)
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
[(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1d
j
k,ℓ +
(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Tk,ℓ+1d
j
ℓ,ℓ
+
(
Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T
Tk,ℓ+1fℓ,ℓ +ΦTℓ ρk,ℓ + qk,ℓ,
πk,N = gk, ℓ ∈ Tk, k ∈ Tt
with
Γk = −O
†
kLk − Φk, k ∈ Tt (3.11)
and
βk,ℓ = Φ
T
ℓ Rk,ℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T [
Sk,ℓ+1Bk,ℓ + Tk,ℓ+1Bℓ,ℓ
]
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T [
Sk,ℓ+1D
j
k,ℓ + Tk,ℓ+1D
j
ℓ,ℓ
]
, ℓ ∈ Tk.
Furthermore, under condition ii), let
v
t,x
k = ΓkX
t,x,∗
k −O
†
kθk, k ∈ Tt, (3.12)
and Φk,Γk, k ∈ Tt, are given in ii); then, (Φ, vt,x) is a mixed equilibrium solution of Problem (LQ)tx.
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Proof. See Appendix C. 
Remark 3.6. In Theorem 3.5, the solvability of (3.9) is to characterize the convexity (3.7), while (3.10)
is to characterize the stationary condition (3.6). If Φℓ, Γℓ, ℓ ∈ Tk+1 have been determined, then −O
†
kLk
can be further constructed. Noting (3.11), it is impossible to determine the value of Φk by using the property
Φk + Γk = −O
†
kLk, and any (Φ, v
t,x) that satisfies condition ii) of Theorem 3.5 is a mixed equilibrium
solution. Nevertheless, the freedom of selecting Φ could enable us to deal with the open-loop equilibrium
control and linear feedback equilibrium strategy in a unified way.
From Theorem 3.5, the following two corollaries are straightforward. The first concerns the open-loop
equilibrium control, which is obtained by letting Φ = 0 in Theorem 3.5.
Corollary 3.7. The following statements are equivalent:
i) Problem (LQ)tx admits an open-loop equilibrium control.
ii) The following assertions hold.
a) The coupled equations

Ŝk,ℓ = Qk,ℓ +A
T
k,ℓŜk,ℓ+1Ak,ℓ +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ (C
i
k,ℓ)
T Ŝk,ℓ+1C
j
k,ℓ,
Ŝk,ℓ = Qk,ℓ +ATk,ℓŜk,ℓ+1Ak,ℓ +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ (C
i
k,ℓ)
T Ŝk,ℓ+1C
j
k,ℓ,
Ŝk,N = Gk, Ŝk,N = Gk + G¯k, ℓ ∈ Tk,
Ôk  0, k ∈ Tt
(3.13)
are solvable in the sense of Ôk  0, k ∈ Tt.
b) The condition
L̂kX̂
t,x,∗
k + θ̂k ∈ Ran
(
Ôk
)
, k ∈ Tt (3.14)
is satisfied. Here, X̂t,x,∗ is computed via
X̂
t,x,∗
k+1 =
[(
Ak,k − Bk,kÔ
†
kL̂k
)
X̂
t,x,∗
k − Bk,kÔ
†
kθ̂k + fk,k
]
+
∑p
i=1
[(
Cik,k −D
i
k,kÔ
†
kL̂k
)
X̂
t,x,∗
k −D
i
k,kÔ
†
kθ̂k + d
i
k,k
]
wik,
X̂
t,x,∗
t = x, k ∈ Tt,
and Ôk, L̂k, θk, k ∈ Tt are given by
Ôk = Rk,k + BTk,k
(
Ŝk,k+1 + T̂k,k+1
)
Bk,k +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
k (D
i
k,k)
T
(
Ŝk,k+1 + T̂k,k+1
)
Djk,k,
L̂k = BTk,k
(
Ŝk,k+1 + T̂k,k+1
)
Ak,k +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
k (D
i
k,k)
T
(
Ŝk,k+1 + T̂k,k+1
)
Cjk,k
+ BTk,kÛk,k+1,
θ̂k = BTk,k
(
Ŝk,k+1 + T̂k,k+1
)
fk,k +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
k (D
i
k,k)
T
(
Ŝk,+1 + T̂k,k+1
)
d
j
k,k
+ BTk,kπ̂k,k+1 + ρk,k,
k ∈ Tt,
(3.15)
where
T̂k,ℓ = A
T
k,ℓT̂k,ℓ+1Aℓ,ℓ +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ (C
i
k,ℓ)
T T̂k,ℓ+1C
j
ℓ,ℓ −
{
ATk,ℓŜk,ℓ+1Bk,ℓ
+
∑p
i,j=1(C
i
k,ℓ)
T Ŝk,ℓ+1D
j
k,ℓ +A
T
k,ℓT̂k,ℓ+1Bℓ,ℓ +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ (C
i
k,ℓ)
T T̂k,ℓ+1D
j
ℓ,ℓ
}
Ô†ℓ L̂ℓ,
T̂k,ℓ = ATk,ℓT̂k,ℓ+1Aℓ,ℓ +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ (C
i
k,ℓ)
T T̂k,ℓ+1C
j
ℓ,ℓ −
{
ATk,ℓŜk,ℓ+1Bk,ℓ
+
∑p
i,j=1(C
i
k,ℓ)
T Ŝk,ℓ+1D
j
k,ℓ +A
T
k,ℓT̂k,ℓ+1Bℓ,ℓ +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ (C
i
k,ℓ)
T T̂k,ℓ+1D
j
ℓ,ℓ
}
Ô†ℓ L̂ℓ,
T̂k,N = 0, T̂k,N = 0, ℓ ∈ Tk, k ∈ Tt,
{
Ûk,ℓ = Ak,ℓÛk,ℓ+1,
Ûk,N = Fk, ℓ ∈ Tk, k ∈ Tt,
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and 
π̂k,ℓ = −β̂k,ℓÔ
†
ℓ θ̂ℓ +A
T
k,ℓ
(
Ŝk,ℓ+1fk,ℓ + π̂k,ℓ+1
)
+ATk,ℓT̂k,ℓ+1fℓ,ℓ
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
[
(Cik,ℓ)
T Ŝk,ℓ+1d
j
k,ℓ + (C
i
k,ℓ)
T T̂k,ℓ+1d
j
ℓ,ℓ
]
+ qk,ℓ,
π̂k,N = gk, ℓ ∈ Tk, k ∈ Tt,
with
β̂k,ℓ = A
T
k,ℓ
[
Ŝk,ℓ+1Bk,ℓ + T̂k,ℓ+1Bℓ,ℓ
]
+
p∑
i,j=1
δ
ij
ℓ (C
i
k,ℓ)
T
[
Ŝk,ℓ+1D
j
k,ℓ + T̂k,ℓ+1D
j
ℓ,ℓ
]
, ℓ ∈ Tk.
Furthermore, under condition ii), the control
v̂
t,x
k = −Ô
†
kL̂kX̂
t,x,∗
k − Ô
†
kθ̂k, k ∈ Tt
is an open-loop equilibrium control of Problem (LQ)tx.
Note that the linear feedback equilibrium strategy has nothing to do with the initial state x. The second
corollary is concerned with the existence of a linear feedback equilibrium strategy, which is obtained by
letting Γk = 0, k ∈ Tt in Theorem 3.5.
Corollary 3.8. The following statements are equivalent:
i) Problem (LQ)tx admits a linear feedback equilibrium strategy.
ii) The following assertions hold.
a) The coupled equations

S˜k,ℓ = Qk,ℓ + Φ˜
T
ℓ Rk,ℓΦ˜ℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦ˜ℓ
)T
S˜k,ℓ+1
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦ˜ℓ
)
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦ˜ℓ
)T
S˜k,ℓ+1
(
C
j
k,ℓ +D
j
k,ℓΦ˜ℓ
)
,
S˜k,ℓ = Qk,ℓ + Φ˜Tℓ Rk,ℓΦ˜ℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦ˜ℓ
)T
S˜k,ℓ+1(Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦ˜ℓ)
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦ˜ℓ
)T
S˜k,ℓ+1(C
j
k,ℓ +D
j
k,ℓΦ˜ℓ),
S˜k,N = Gk, S˜k,N = Gk + G¯k, ℓ ∈ Tk,
O˜k = Rk,k + BTk,kS˜k,k+1Bk,k +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
k (D
i
k,k)
T S˜k,k+1D
j
k,k  0, k ∈ Tt
(3.16)
are solvable in the sense of O˜k  0, k ∈ Tt.
b) The condition
L˜kX˜
t,x,∗
k + θ˜k ∈ Ran
(
O˜k
)
, k ∈ Tt (3.17)
is satisfied. Here, X˜t,x,∗ is computed via
X˜
t,x,∗
k+1 =
[(
Ak,k − Bk,kO˜
†
kL˜k
)
X˜
t,x,∗
k − Bk,kO˜
†
kθ˜k + fk,k
]
+
∑p
i=1
[(
Cik,k −D
i
k,kO˜
†
kL˜k
)
X˜
t,x,∗
k −D
i
k,kO˜
†
kθ˜k + d
i
k,k
]
wik,
X˜
t,x,∗
t = x, k ∈ Tt,
and L˜k, θ˜k, k ∈ Tt are given by{
L˜k = BTk,kS˜k,k+1Ak,k +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
k (D
i
k,k)
T S˜k,k+1C
j
k,k + B
T
k,kU˜k,k+1,
θ˜k = BTk,kS˜k,k+1fk,k +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
k (D
i
k,k)
T S˜k,k+1d
j
k,k + B
T
k,kπ˜k,k+1 + ρk,k, k ∈ Tt,
where {
U˜k,ℓ = (Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦ˜ℓ)U˜k,ℓ+1,
U˜k,N = Fk, ℓ ∈ Tk, k ∈ Tt,
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
π˜k,ℓ = −β˜k,ℓO˜
†
ℓ θ˜ℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦ˜ℓ
)T (
S˜k,ℓ+1fk,ℓ + π˜k,ℓ+1
)
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦ˜ℓ
)T
S˜k,ℓ+1d
j
k,ℓ + Φ˜
T
ℓ ρk,ℓ + qk,ℓ,
πk,N = gk, ℓ ∈ Tk, k ∈ Tt
with
β˜k,ℓ = Φ˜
T
ℓ Rk,ℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦ˜ℓ
)T
S˜k,ℓ+1Bk,ℓ +
p∑
i,j=1
δ
ij
ℓ
(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦ˜ℓ
)T
S˜k,ℓ+1D
j
k,ℓ, ℓ ∈ Tk.
c) Φ˜ above is given by {Φ˜k = −O˜
†
kL˜k, k ∈ Tt}.
Furthermore, under condition ii), {(−O˜†kL˜k,−O˜
†
kθ˜k), k ∈ Tt} is a linear feedback equilibrium strategy of
Problem (LQ)tx.
We now consider the unique existence of open-loop equilibrium control and linear feedback equilibrium
strategy.
Theorem 3.9. Let t ∈ T and x ∈ l2F (t;R
n). The following is true.
i) The following statements are equivalent:
a) Problem (LQ)tx admits a unique open-loop equilibrium control.
b) (3.13) is solvable, and Ôk, k ∈ Tt, are invertible, which are given in (3.15).
c) For any k ∈ Tt and any ξ ∈ l2F (k;R
n), Problem (LQ)kξ admits a unique open-loop equilibrium
control.
ii) The following statements are equivalent:
d) Problem (LQ)tx admits a unique linear feedback equilibrium strategy.
e) O˜k ≻ 0, k ∈ Tt, namely, O˜k, k ∈ Tt, are all positive definite, which are given in (3.16).
f) For any k ∈ Tt and any ξ ∈ l2F(k;R
n), Problem (LQ)kξ admits a unique linear feedback equilibrium
strategy.
Proof. i). a)⇔b). Let v̂t,x be an open-loop equilibrium control of Problem (LQ)tx. In this case, (3.6)
becomes
0 = Rk,k v̂
t,x
k + B
T
k,kEkY
k
k+1 +
p∑
i=1
(Dik,k)
T
Ek
(
Y kk+1w
i
k
)
+ ρk,k, k ∈ Tt. (3.18)
Mimicking the proof of Theorem 3.5 and based on Lemma 3.4, a control of the following form
v̂
t,x
k = −Ô
†
kL̂kX̂
t,x,∗
k − Ô
†
kθ̂k + (I − Ô
†
kÔk)Vk, k ∈ Tt (3.19)
also satisfies (3.18), where Vk ∈ R
m is deterministic and X̂t,x,∗, θ̂k are given by
X̂
t,x,∗
k+1 =
[(
Ak,k − Bk,kÔ
†
kL̂k
)
X̂
t,x,∗
k − Bk,k
(
Ô†kθ̂k − (I − Ô
†
kÔk)Vk
)
+ fk,k
]
+
∑p
i=1
[(
Cik,k −D
i
k,kÔ
†
kL̂k
)
X̂
t,x,∗
k −D
i
k,k
(
Ô†kθ̂k − (I − Ô
†
kÔk)Vk
)
+ dik,k
]
wik,
X̂
t,x,∗
t = x, k ∈ Tt,
and
θ̂k = B
T
k,k
(
Ŝk,k+1 + T̂k,k+1
)
fk,k +
p∑
i,j=1
δ
ij
k (D
i
k,k)
T
(
Ŝk,+1 + T̂k,k+1
)
d
j
k,k + B
T
k,kπ̂k,k+1 + ρk,k,
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with π̂k,k+1 computed via
π̂k,ℓ = −β̂k,ℓ
[
Ô†ℓ θ̂ℓ − (I − Ô
†
ℓÔℓ)Vℓ
]
+ATk,ℓ
(
Ŝk,ℓ+1fk,ℓ + π̂k,ℓ+1
)
+ATk,ℓT̂k,ℓ+1fℓ,ℓ
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
[
(Cik,ℓ)
T Ŝk,ℓ+1d
j
k,ℓ + (C
i
k,ℓ)
T T̂k,ℓ+1d
j
ℓ,ℓ
]
+ qk,ℓ,
π̂k,N = gk, ℓ ∈ Tk, k ∈ Tt.
Combining the solvability of (3.13), we know that any control of the form (3.19) is an open-loop equilibrium
control of Problem (LQ)tx. Therefore, Problem (LQ)tx admits a unique open-loop equilibrium control if and
only if Ôk, k ∈ Tt are invertible, and (3.13) is solvable.
b)⇒c). As (3.13) is solvable and Ôk, k ∈ Tt, are invertible, we know from Corollary 3.7 that Problem
(LQ)kξ admits an open-loop equilibrium control. Based on the proof of a)⇒b), it follows that Problem
(LQ)kξ admits a unique open-loop equilibrium control.
c)⇒a). It is obvious.
ii). d)⇔e). Let (Φ, v) be a linear feedback equilibrium strategy of Problem (LQ)tx. O˜k  0, k ∈ Tk
follows from the solvability of (3.16). We now prove that O˜k, k ∈ Tk are all invertible. Note that the linear
feedback equilibrium strategy is independent of x. If some of O˜k, k ∈ Tk, are singular, then similar to those
of a)⇒b), v can be selected as any one of the following forms:
vk = −O˜
†
kθ˜k + (I − O˜
†
kO˜k)Vk, k ∈ Tt. (3.20)
In (3.20), Vk ∈ Rm, k ∈ Tt, are deterministic, and θ˜k is given by
θ˜k = B
T
k,kS˜k,k+1fk,k +
p∑
i,j=1
δ
ij
k (D
i
k,k)
T S˜k,+1d
j
k,k + B
T
k,kπ˜k,k+1 + ρk,k,
with π˜k,k+1 computed via
π˜k,ℓ = −β˜k,ℓ
[
O˜†ℓ θ˜ℓ − (I − O˜
†
ℓO˜ℓ)Vℓ
]
+
(
Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦ˜ℓ
)T (
S˜k,ℓ+1fk,ℓ + π˜k,ℓ+1
)
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦ˜ℓ
)T
S˜k,ℓ+1d
j
k,ℓ + Φ˜
T
ℓ ρk,ℓ + qk,ℓ,
πk,N = gk, ℓ ∈ Tk, k ∈ Tt.
Therefore, Problem (LQ)tx admits a unique linear feedback equilibrium strategy if and only if O˜k, k ∈ Tk
are all invertible, and thus are positive definite.
e)⇒f) and f)⇒d) are obvious. This completes the proof. 
Remark 3.10. Problem (LQ)tx admitting a unique open-loop equilibrium control is a local property,
which is only of the unique existence for the fixed initial pair (t, x). Interestingly, this local property could
ensure a semi-global property, namely, for any k ∈ Tt (after t) and any ξ ∈ l2F(k;R
n), Problem (LQ)kξ
also admits a unique open-loop equilibrium control. A similar property also holds for the linear feedback
equilibrium strategy.
3.2 The case with all of the initial pairs
Simply knowing that Problem (LQ)tx admits an open-loop equilibrium control or a linear feedback equilib-
rium strategy, it is hard or generally impossible to derive sharp results like those of Theorem 3.9. Alterna-
tively, in this section, we consider the case that the initial pair is allowed to vary. To begin, we first state
the results for the open-loop equilibrium control.
Theorem 3.11. The following statements are equivalent:
i) For any (t, x) with t ∈ T and x ∈ l2F(t;R
n), Problem (LQ)tx admits an open-loop equilibrium control.
ii) The coupled equations

Ŝk,ℓ = Qk,ℓ +A
T
k,ℓŜk,ℓ+1Ak,ℓ +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ (C
i
k,ℓ)
T Ŝk,ℓ+1C
j
k,ℓ,
Ŝk,ℓ = Qk,ℓ +ATk,ℓŜk,ℓ+1Ak,ℓ +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ (C
i
k,ℓ)
T Ŝk,ℓ+1C
j
k,ℓ,
Ŝk,N = Gk, Ŝk,N = Gk + G¯k, ℓ ∈ Tk,
Ôk  0, k ∈ T,
(3.21)
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

T̂k,ℓ = A
T
k,ℓT̂k,ℓ+1Aℓ,ℓ +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ (C
i
k,ℓ)
T T̂k,ℓ+1C
j
ℓ,ℓ −
{
ATk,ℓŜk,ℓ+1Bk,ℓ
+ATk,ℓT̂k,ℓ+1Bℓ,ℓ +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
[
(Cik,ℓ)
T Ŝk,ℓ+1D
j
k,ℓ + (C
i
k,ℓ)
T T̂k,ℓ+1D
j
ℓ,ℓ
]}
Ô†ℓ L̂ℓ,
T̂k,ℓ = ATk,ℓT̂k,ℓ+1Aℓ,ℓ +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ (C
i
k,ℓ)
T T̂k,ℓ+1C
j
ℓ,ℓ −
{
ATk,ℓŜk,ℓ+1Bk,ℓ
+ATk,ℓT̂k,ℓ+1Bℓ,ℓ +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
[
(Cik,ℓ)
T Ŝk,ℓ+1D
j
k,ℓ + (C
i
k,ℓ)
T T̂k,ℓ+1D
j
ℓ,ℓ
]}
Ô†ℓ L̂ℓ,
T̂k,N = 0, T̂k,N = 0, ℓ ∈ Tk,
ÔkÔ
†
kL̂k = L̂k, k ∈ T,
(3.22)
and 

π̂k,ℓ = −β̂k,ℓÔ
†
ℓ θ̂ℓ +A
T
k,ℓ
(
Ŝk,ℓ+1fk,ℓ + π̂k,ℓ+1
)
+ATk,ℓT̂k,ℓ+1fℓ,ℓ
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
[
(Cik,ℓ)
T Ŝk,ℓ+1d
j
k,ℓ + (C
i
k,ℓ)
T T̂k,ℓ+1d
j
ℓ,ℓ
]
+ qk,ℓ,
π̂k,N = gk, ℓ ∈ Tk,
ÔkÔ
†
kθ̂k = θ̂k, k ∈ T
(3.23)
are solvable in the sense of
Ôk  0, ÔkÔ
†
kL̂k − L̂k = 0, ÔkÔ
†
kθ̂k − θ̂k = 0, k ∈ T,
where
Ôk = Rk,k + BTk,kŜk,k+1Bk,k +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
k (D
i
k,k)
T Ŝk,k+1D
j
k,k,
Ôk = Rk,k + BTk,k
(
Ŝk,k+1 + T̂k,k+1
)
Bk,k +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
k (D
i
k,k)
T
(
Ŝk,k+1 + T̂k,k+1
)
Djk,k,
L̂k = BTk,k
(
Ŝk,k+1 + T̂k,k+1
)
Ak,k +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
k (D
i
k,k)
T
(
Ŝk,k+1 + T̂k,k+1
)
Cjk,k + B
T
k,kÛk,k+1,
θ̂k = BTk,k
(
Ŝk,k+1 + T̂k,k+1
)
fk,k +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
k (D
i
k,k)
T
(
Ŝk,+1 + T̂k,k+1
)
d
j
k,k + B
T
k,kπ̂k,k+1 + ρk,k,
k ∈ T
with {
Ûk,ℓ = Ak,ℓÛk,ℓ+1,
Ûk,N = Fk, ℓ ∈ Tk, k ∈ T,
and
β̂k,ℓ = A
T
k,ℓ
[
Ŝk,ℓ+1Bk,ℓ + T̂k,ℓ+1Bℓ,ℓ
]
+
p∑
i,j=1
δ
ij
ℓ (C
i
k,ℓ)
T
[
Ŝk,ℓ+1D
j
k,ℓ + T̂k,ℓ+1D
j
ℓ,ℓ
]
, ℓ ∈ Tk.
Proof. ii)⇒i). From the solvability of (3.22) and (3.23), we know that (3.14) holds for any (t, x).
Therefore, i) holds.
i)⇒ii). Note that (3.14) is equivalent to ÔkÔ
†
k
(
L̂kX̂
t,x,∗
k + θ̂k
)
= L̂kX̂
t,x,∗
k + θ̂k, k ∈ Tt. Letting k = t
and taking different x′s, we have ÔtÔ
†
t L̂t = L̂t, ÔtÔ
†
t θ̂t = θ̂t. As for any (t, x) with t ∈ T and x ∈ l
2
F (t;R
n)
Problem (LQ)tx admits an open-loop equilibrium control, we must have the solvability of (3.21)-(3.23). 
The following result is for the feedback equilibrium strategy.
Theorem 3.12. The following statements are equivalent:
i) For any (t, x) with t ∈ T and x ∈ l2F(t;R
n), Problem (LQ)tx admits a linear feedback equilibrium
strategy.
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ii) The coupled equations

S˜k,ℓ = Qk,ℓ +A
T
k,ℓS˜k,ℓ+1Ak,ℓ +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ (C
i
k,ℓ)
T S˜k,ℓ+1C
j
k,ℓ
−
(
ATk,ℓS˜k,ℓ+1Bk,ℓ +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ (C
i
k,ℓ)
T S˜k,ℓ+1D
j
k,ℓ
)
O˜
†
ℓL˜ℓ
− L˜Tℓ O˜
†
ℓ
(
BTk,ℓS˜k,ℓ+1Ak,ℓ +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ (D
i
k,ℓ)
T S˜k,ℓ+1C
j
k,ℓ
)
+ L˜Tℓ O˜
†
ℓ
(
Rk,ℓ +B
T
k,ℓS˜k,ℓ+1Bk,ℓ +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ (D
i
k,ℓ)
T S˜k,ℓ+1D
j
k,ℓ
)
O˜
†
ℓL˜ℓ,
S˜k,ℓ = Qk,ℓ +ATk,ℓS˜k,ℓ+1Ak,ℓ +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ (C
i
k,ℓ)
T S˜k,ℓ+1C
j
k,ℓ
−
(
ATk,ℓS˜k,ℓ+1Bk,ℓ +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ (C
i
k,ℓ)
T S˜k,ℓ+1D
j
k,ℓ
)
O˜
†
ℓL˜ℓ
− L˜Tℓ O˜
†
ℓ
(
BTk,ℓS˜k,ℓ+1Ak,ℓ +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ (D
i
k,ℓ)
T S˜k,ℓ+1C
j
k,ℓ
)
+ L˜Tℓ O˜
†
ℓ
(
Rk,ℓ + BTk,ℓS˜k,ℓ+1Bk,ℓ +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ (D
i
k,ℓ)
T S˜k,ℓ+1D
j
k,ℓ
)
O˜
†
ℓL˜ℓ,
S˜k,N = Gk, S˜k,N = Gk + G¯k, ℓ ∈ Tk,
O˜k  0, O˜kO˜
†
kL˜k = L˜k, k ∈ T,
(3.24)
and 

π˜k,ℓ = −β˜k,ℓO˜
†
kθ˜k +
(
Ak,ℓ − Bk,ℓO˜
†
ℓL˜ℓ
)T (
S˜k,ℓ+1fk,ℓ + π˜k,ℓ+1
)
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
(
Cik,ℓ −D
i
k,ℓO˜
†
ℓL˜ℓ
)T
S˜k,ℓ+1d
j
k,ℓ − L˜
T
ℓ O˜
†
ℓρk,ℓ + qk,ℓ,
πk,N = gk, ℓ ∈ Tk,
O˜kO˜
†
kθ˜k = θ˜k, k ∈ T
(3.25)
are solvable in the sense of
O˜k  0, O˜kO˜
†
kL˜k = L˜k, O˜kO˜
†
kθ˜k = θ˜k, k ∈ T,
where 
O˜k = Rk,k + B
T
k,kS˜k,k+1Bk,k +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
k (D
i
k,k)
T S˜k,k+1D
j
k,k,
L˜k = B
T
k,kS˜k,k+1Ak,k +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
k (D
i
k,k)
T S˜k,k+1C
j
k,k + B
T
k,kU˜k,k+1,
θ˜k = BTk,kS˜k,k+1fk,k +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
k (D
i
k,k)
T S˜k,k+1d
j
k,k + B
T
k,kπ˜k,k+1 + ρk,k,
k ∈ T
with {
U˜k,ℓ = (Ak,ℓ − Bk,ℓO˜
†
ℓL˜ℓ)U˜k,ℓ+1,
U˜k,N = Fk, ℓ ∈ Tk, k ∈ T,
and
β˜k,ℓ = −L˜
T
ℓ O˜
†
ℓRk,ℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ − Bk,ℓO˜
†
ℓL˜ℓ
)T
S˜k,ℓ+1Bk,ℓ +
p∑
i,j=1
δ
ij
ℓ
(
Cik,ℓ −D
i
k,ℓO˜
†
ℓL˜ℓ
)T
S˜k,ℓ+1D
j
k,ℓ, ℓ ∈ Tk.
iii) There exists a pair (Φ, v) ∈ l2(T;Rm×n) × l2F(T;R
m) such that for any (t, x) with t ∈ T and x ∈
l2F(t;R
n), (Φ, v)|Tt is a linear feedback equilibrium strategy of Problem (LQ)tx. Here, (Φ, v)|Tt is the
restriction of (Φ, v) on Tt.
iv) There exists a ψ ∈ FT such that for any (t, x) with t ∈ T and x ∈ l2F(t;R
n), ψ|Tt is a feedback
equilibrium strategy of Problem (LQ)tx. Here, ψ|Tt is the restriction of ψ on Tt.
Furthermore, under any of the above conditions, the pair (Φt, vt) with Φt = {−O˜†kL˜k, k ∈ Tt}, v
t =
{−O˜†kθ˜k, k ∈ Tt} is a feedback equilibrium strategy of Problem (LQ)tx.
Proof. See Appendix D. 
We now consider the mixed equilibrium solution. If it exists, we have some freedom to select the pure-
feedback-strategy part of the mixed equilibrium solution, as pointed out in Remark 3.6. In Theorem 3.13,
we have the necessary and sufficient condition to ensure the existence of a mixed equilibrium solution for
all of the initial pairs. Because different initial pairs may correspond to different pure-feedback-strategy
parts of the mixed equilibrium solution, the condition of Theorem 3.13 is for the case that specifies the
pure-feedback-strategy part Φ.
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Theorem 3.13. The following statements are equivalent:
i) For any (t, x) with t ∈ T and x ∈ l2F (t;R
n), Problem (LQ)tx admits a mixed equilibrium solution and
the pure-feedback-strategy part is Φ|Tt . Here, Φ ∈ l
2(T;Rm×n) and Φ|Tt is the restriction of Φ on Tt.
ii) There exists Φ ∈ l2(T;Rm×n) such that the following difference equations

Sk,ℓ = Qk,ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ Rk,ℓΦℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1
(
C
j
k,ℓ +D
j
k,ℓΦℓ
)
,
Sk,ℓ = Qk,ℓ +ΦTℓ Rk,ℓΦℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1(Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦℓ)
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1(C
j
k,ℓ +D
j
k,ℓΦℓ),
Sk,N = Gk, Sk,N = Gk + G¯k, ℓ ∈ Tk,
Ok = Rk,k + BTk,kSk,k+1Bk,k +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
k (D
i
k,k)
TSk,k+1D
j
k,k  0, k ∈ T,
(3.26)


Tk,ℓ =
{
ΦTℓ Rk,ℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1Bk,ℓ
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1D
j
k,ℓ
}
Γℓ
+
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T
Tk,ℓ+1
(
Aℓ,ℓ + Bℓ,ℓΦℓ + Bℓ,ℓΓℓ
)
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Tk,ℓ+1
(
Cjℓ,ℓ +D
j
ℓ,ℓΦℓ +D
j
ℓ,ℓΓℓ
)
,
Tk,ℓ =
{
ΦTℓ Rk,ℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1Bk,ℓ
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1D
j
k,ℓ
}
Γℓ
+
(
Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T
Tk,ℓ+1
(
Aℓ,ℓ + Bℓ,ℓΦℓ + Bℓ,ℓΓℓ
)
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Tk,ℓ+1
(
Cjℓ,ℓ +D
j
ℓ,ℓΦℓ +D
j
ℓ,ℓΓℓ
)
Tk,N = 0, Tk,N = 0, ℓ ∈ Tk,
OkO
†
kLk = Lk, k ∈ T,
(3.27)
and 

πk,ℓ = −βk,ℓO
†
ℓθℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T (
Sk,ℓ+1fk,ℓ + πk,ℓ+1
)
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
[(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1d
j
k,ℓ +
(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T
Tk,ℓ+1d
j
ℓ,ℓ
+
(
Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T
Tk,ℓ+1fℓ,ℓ +ΦTℓ ρk,ℓ + qk,ℓ,
πk,N = gk, ℓ ∈ Tk,
OkO
†
kθk = θk, k ∈ T
(3.28)
are solvable in the sense of Ok  0, OkO
†
kLk = Lk, OkO
†
kθk = θk, k ∈ T, where
Ok = Rk,k + BTk,k
(
Sk,k+1 + Tk,k+1
)
Bk,k +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
k (D
i
k,k)
T
(
Sk,k+1 + Tk,k+1
)
Djk,k,
Lk = BTk,k
(
Sk,k+1 + Tk,k+1
)
Ak,k +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
k (D
i
k,k)
T
(
Sk,k+1 + Tk,k+1
)
Cjk,k + B
T
k,kUk,k+1,
θk = BTk,k
(
Sk,k+1 + Tk,k+1
)
fk,k +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
k (D
i
k,k)
T
(
Sk,k+1 + Tk,k+1
)
d
j
k,k + B
T
k,kπk,k+1 + ρk,k,
k ∈ T
and Γk = −O
†
kLk − Φk, k ∈ T with{
Uk,ℓ = (Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦℓ)Uk,ℓ+1,
Uk,N = Fk, ℓ ∈ Tk, k ∈ T,
and
βk,ℓ = Φ
T
ℓ Rk,ℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T [
Sk,ℓ+1Bk,ℓ + Tk,ℓ+1Bℓ,ℓ
]
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)T [
Sk,ℓ+1D
j
k,ℓ + Tk,ℓ+1D
j
ℓ,ℓ
]
, ℓ ∈ Tk.
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For any t ∈ T and x ∈ l2F(t;R
n), let vt,xk = −
(
O†kLk +Φk
)
X
t,x,∗
k −O
†
kθk, k ∈ Tt, where
X
t,x,∗
k+1 =
[(
Ak,k − Bk,kO
†
kLk
)
X
t,x,∗
k − Bk,kO
†
kθk + fk,k
]
+
∑p
i=1
[(
Cik,k −D
i
k,kO
†
kLk
)
X
t,x,∗
k −D
i
k,kO
†
kθk + d
i
k,k
]
wik,
X
t,x,∗
t = x, k ∈ Tt.
Under condition ii) and for any (t, x) with t ∈ T and x ∈ l2F (t;R
n), (Φ|Tt , v
t,x) is a mixed equilibrium
solution of Problem (LQ)tx.
Proof. ii)⇒i). This follows from Theorem 3.5.
i)⇒ii). In this case, for any (t, x) with t ∈ T and x ∈ l2F(t;R
n), the pure-feedback-strategy part of the
mixed equilibrium solution is Φ|Tt . Note that (3.10) is equivalent to OkO
†
k
(
LkX
t,x,∗
k + θk
)
= LkX
t,x,∗
k + θk,
k ∈ Tt. Letting k = t and taking different x′s, we have OtO
†
tLt = Lt, OtO
†
t θt = θt. Therefore, (3.9), (3.27),
and (3.28) are solvable. 
To end this section, we pose the following assumption.
(H) Qt,k, Qt,k + Q¯t,k, Gt, Gt + G¯k  0, Rt,k, Rt,k + R¯t,k ≻ 0, t ∈ T, k ∈ Tt.
The following result is straightforward.
Theorem 3.14. Letting (H) hold, then O˜k, k ∈ T, are all positive definite. Furthermore, for any t ∈ T
and any x ∈ l2F(t;R
n), Problem (LQ)tx admits a unique feedback equilibrium strategy (Φ, v) with
Φ = {−O˜−1k L˜k, k ∈ Tt}, v = {−O˜
−1
k θ˜k, k ∈ Tt}.
Proof. A simple calculation shows that (3.24) is equal to

S˜k,ℓ = Qk,ℓ + L˜
T
ℓ O˜
†
ℓRk,ℓO˜
†
ℓL˜ℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ −Bk,ℓO˜
†
ℓL˜ℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1
(
Ak,ℓ −Bk,ℓO˜
†
ℓL˜ℓ
)
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
(
Cik,ℓ −D
i
k,ℓO˜
†
ℓL˜ℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1
(
C
j
k,ℓ −D
j
k,ℓO˜
†
ℓL˜ℓ
)
,
S˜k,ℓ = Qk,ℓ + L˜Tℓ O˜
†
ℓRk,ℓO˜
†
ℓL˜ℓ +
(
Ak,ℓ − Bk,ℓO˜
†
ℓL˜ℓ
)T
S˜k,ℓ+1(Ak,ℓ − Bk,ℓO˜
†
ℓL˜ℓ)
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
ℓ
(
Cik,ℓ −D
i
k,ℓO˜
†
ℓL˜ℓ
)T
Sk,ℓ+1(C
j
k,ℓ −D
j
k,ℓO˜
†
ℓL˜ℓ),
S˜k,N = Gk, S˜k,N = Gk + G¯k, ℓ ∈ Tk,
O˜k  0, O˜kO˜
†
kL˜k = L˜k, k ∈ Tt.
(3.29)
Due to (H), we have that S˜k,ℓ, S˜k,ℓ  0, O˜k ≻ 0, k ∈ T, ℓ ∈ Tk. Therefore, (3.24) and (3.25) are solvable.
This completes the proof. 
4 An example
Consider a discrete-time stochastic LQ problem, whose system dynamics and cost functional are given,
respectively, by {
Xk+1 = (AkXk +Bkuk) +Dkukwk,
Xt = x, t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, k ∈ {t, ..., 3},
and
J(t, x;u) =
3∑
k=t
Et
[
XTk QkX
t
k + u
T
kRkuk
]
+ Et
[
XT4 GX4
]
+ (EtX4)
T G¯EtX4,
where
A0 =
[
1 0.4
0.3 2
]
, A1 =
[
1.102 −0.24
0.53 1.89
]
, A2 =
[
1.89 0.49
0 1.75
]
, A3 =
[
0.8 −0.4
0.2 0.7
]
,
B0 =
[
1.2
−0.5
]
, B1 =
[
1
1
]
, B2 =
[
1.2
0.2
]
, B3 =
[
1
0.3
]
, D0 =
[
1
0.3
]
, D1 =
[
1
0.4
]
,
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D2 =
[
0.45
0.25
]
, D3 =
[
0.52
0
]
, Q0 =
[
3 0.5
0.5 −2
]
, Q1 =
[
2 −0.65
−0.65 0
]
, Q2 =
[
0.5 0.5
0.5 −2
]
,
Q3 =
[
−0.1 0
0 −0.75
]
, R0 = 0, R1 = −2.5, R2 = 1, R3 = −0.5,
G =
[
1 −0.1
−0.1 1
]
, G¯ =
[
−0.3 0
0 −0.3
]
,
and {wk, k = 0, 1, 2, 3} is a martingale difference with constant second-order conditional moment Ek(w2k) =
1, k = 0, 1, 2, 3.
Open-loop equilibrium control
For this LQ problem, by performing the iteration (3.21), we have Ô0 = 8.7645, Ô1 = −0.4783, Ô2 =
1.6935, Ô3 = 0.7193. Because Ô1 = −0.4783 < 0, for (t, x) with t = 0, 1 and x ∈ l2F (0;R
2) or x ∈ l2F(1;R
2)
and based on Corollary 3.7, the open-loop equilibrium control of this LQ problem must not exist.
Feedback equilibrium strategy
By performing the iteration (3.24), we have O˜0 = −11.0590, O˜1 = 20.5335, O˜2 = −0.5593, O˜3 = 0.4734.
Because O˜0 < 0, O˜2 < 0, for (t, x) with t = 0, 1, 2 and x ∈ l
2
F(0;R
2) or x ∈ l2F(1;R
2), and based on Corollary
3.8 and Theorem 3.12, the feedback equilibrium strategy of this LQ problem must not exist.
Mixed equilibrium solution
We use the command “randn” of MATLAB to randomly generate Φ = {Φk, k = 0, 1, 2, 3}. Note that
Φk ∈ R1×2,Ok,Ok ∈ R1, k = 0, 1, 2, 3, and let
ψ = [ΦT0 , Φ
T
1 , Φ
T
2 , Φ
T
3 ]
T , O = (O0,O1,O2,O3), O = (O0,O1,O2,O3).
By performing the iterations (3.9)-(3.27)-(3.28), we select 10 ψs and get the corresponding Os and Os,
ψ =

1.4090 1.4172
−0.1241 1.4897
0.7147 −0.2050
0.7254 −0.0631
 , O = (42.1215, 21.2758, 3.1578, 0.4734),
O = (−2.1680, − 10.6485, 0.4740, 0.4734),
ψ =

0.7269 −0.3034
0.4889 1.0347
0.7172 1.6302
0.6715 −1.2075
 , O = (106.9951, 28.5844, 2.3227, 0.4734),
O = (−2.4665, − 10.5353, 0.4860, 0.4734),
ψ =

0.3192 0.3129
−0.1022 −0.2414
1.3703 −1.7115
0.3252 −0.7549
 , O = (35.1212, 1.8350, 1.7640, 0.4734),
O = (−0.8786, − 9.8337, 0.4876, 0.4734),
ψ =

−0.7648 −1.4023
−0.1924 0.8886
−0.6156 0.7481
−1.0616 2.3505
 , O = (20.1218, 2.2184, 0.8268, 0.4734),
O = (−1.3929, − 9.2281, 0.4817, 0.4734),
ψ =

−0.4390 −1.7947
−0.0825 −1.9330
−0.6669 0.1873
0.7223 2.5855
 , O = (52.1877, 31.3899, 5.4614, 0.4734),
O = (−1.9877, − 10.6047, 0.4485, 0.4734),
ψ =

0.4900 0.7394
0.3035 −0.6003
0.1001 −0.5445
0.8404 −0.8880
 , O = (31.4336, 2.6274, 2.9500, 0.4734),
O = (−1.0423, − 9.8977, 0.4799, 0.4734),
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ψ =

0.9610 0.1240
1.3546 −1.0722
−2.1384 −0.8396
1.7119 −0.1941
 , O = (429.0833, 38.2114, 6.7849, 0.4734),
O = (1.1514, − 8.0070, 0.4581, 0.4734),
ψ =

1.3790 −1.0582
2.9080 0.8252
−0.1977 −1.2078
1.4367 −1.9609
 , O = (112.4586, 3.2533, 4.0958, 0.4734),
O = (1.7922, − 9.5504, 0.4799, 0.4734),
ψ =

−1.1564 −0.5336
−0.8314 −0.9792
−1.7502 −0.2857
0.0229 −0.2620
 , O = (7.6517, 5.3349, 1.3968, 0.4734),
O = (−0.8077, − 8.7128, 0.4881, 0.4734),
ψ =

0.0513 0.8261
−0.3031 0.0230
−0.1952 −0.2176
0.6601 −0.0679
 , O = (11.0638, 4.5685, 2.9632, 0.4734),
O = (−1.2944, − 9.9027, 0.4752, 0.4734).
For all 10 cases, Ok, k = 0, 1, 2, 3, are all positive, and Ok, k = 0, 1, 2, 3 are all invertible. Then, due to
Theorem 3.13, for any (t, x) with t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and x ∈ l2F(t;R
2), the above 10 cases correspond to 10
mixed equilibrium solutions of the considered LQ problem, which can be easily constructed from Theorem
3.13. For example, with the last ψ given above, the mixed equilibrium solution is as follows. Let
Φ0 = [0.0513 0.8261], Φ1 = [−0.3031 0.0230], Φ2 = [−0.1952 − 0.2176], Φ3 = [0.6601 − 0.0679],
and
v
0,x
k = −
(
O†kLk +Φk
)
X
0,x,∗
k , k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
with {
X
0,x,∗
k+1 =
(
Ak −BkO
†
kLk
)
X
0,x,∗
k −DkO
†
kLkX
0,x,∗
k wk,
X
0,x,∗
0 = x, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3},
and
−O†0L0 = [1.4347, 4.2547],−O
†
1L1 = [−0.3247, − 0.5193],
−O†2L2 = [1.4568, 0.3845],−O
†
3L3 = [−1.1787, 0.4035].
Then, (Φ, v0,x) is a mixed equilibrium solution of this LQ problem for the initial pair (0, x), where Φ =
{Φk, k = 0, 1, 2, 3}.
5 Summary
In this paper, the notion of mixed equilibrium solution is introduced for the time-inconsistent discrete-
time mean-field stochastic LQ optimal control. For a pair of pure-feedback strategy and open-loop control,
necessary and sufficient conditions are given to ensure that such a pair is a mixed equilibrium solution. On
this basis, the open-loop equilibrium control and feedback equivalent strategy can be dealt with in a unified
way.
Although we provide some relevant results, the theory for mixed equilibrium solution is far from mature.
From the example in Section 4, we know that a remarkable property of mixed equilibrium solution is its
non-uniqueness. Thus, we propose that the following topics warrant further study:
i) Characterize the set of all of the mixed equilibrium solutions of Problem (LQ).
ii) Find the “best” mixed equilibrium solution, which should be the one under which the equilibrium
value function attains its extreme.
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iii) As a test, the multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection must be thoroughly investigated.
iv) Finally, the analysis should be extended beyond the realm of the LQ controls and to a continuous-time
setting.
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A Proof of Lemma 3.1
From (2.6) and (3.3), we have
X¯
k,u¯k,λ
ℓ+1
−X
k,Φ
ℓ+1
λ
=
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
) X¯k,u¯k,λ
ℓ
−X
k,Φ
ℓ
λ
+
(
A¯k,ℓ + B¯k,ℓΦℓ
)
EkX
k,λ
ℓ
−EkX
k,uk
ℓ
λ
+
∑p
i=1
[(
Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ
) X¯k,u¯k,λ
ℓ
−X
k,Φ
ℓ
λ
+
(
C¯ik,ℓ + D¯
i
k,ℓΦℓ
)
EkX
k,λ
ℓ
−EkX
k,uk
ℓ
λ
]
wiℓ,
X¯
k,u¯k,λ
k+1
−X
k,Φ
k+1
λ
= Bk,ku¯k +
∑p
i=1D
i
k,ku¯kw
i
k,
X¯
k,u¯k,λ
k
−Xk,Φ
λ
= 0, ℓ ∈ Tk+1.
Denote
X¯
k,u¯k,λ
ℓ
−X
k,Φ
ℓ
λ
by αk,u¯kℓ . Then α
k,u¯k = {αk,u¯kℓ , ℓ ∈ T˜k} satisfies (3.4). Obviously, we have X¯
k,u¯k,λ
ℓ =
X
k,Φ
ℓ + λα
k,u¯k
ℓ , ℓ ∈ Tk. Then, we obtain
J
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ; (Φk · X¯
k,u¯k,λ
k + v
t,x
k + λu¯k, (ΦX¯
k,u¯k,λ + vt,x)|Tk+1)
)
− J
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ; (Φ ·X
k,Φ + vt,x)|Tk
)
= 2λEk
{N−1∑
ℓ=k
[
(Xk,Φℓ )
TQk,ℓα
k,u¯k
ℓ + (EkX
k,Φ
ℓ )
T Q¯k,ℓEkα
k,u¯k
ℓ + (ΦℓX
k,Φ
ℓ + v
t,x
ℓ )
TRk,ℓΦℓα
k,u¯k
ℓ
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+ Ek(ΦℓX
k,Φ
ℓ + v
t,x
ℓ )
T R¯k,ℓΦℓEkα
k,u¯k
ℓ + q
T
k,ℓα
k,u¯k
ℓ + ρ
T
k,ℓΦℓα
k,u¯k
ℓ
]
+
[
Rk,k(ΦkX
k,Φ
k + v
t,x
k ) + ρk,k
]T
u¯k
+
[
GkX
k,Φ
N + FkX
t,x,∗
k + gk
]T
α
k,u¯k
N + (EkX
k,Φ
N )
T G¯kEkα
k,u¯k
N
}
+ λ2
{N−1∑
ℓ=k
Ek
[
(αk,u¯kℓ )
TQk,ℓα
k,u¯k
ℓ + (Ekα
k,u¯k
ℓ )
T Q¯k,ℓEkα
k,u¯k
ℓ + (α
k,u¯k
ℓ )
TΦTℓ Rk,ℓΦℓα
k,u¯k
ℓ
+ (Ekα
k,u¯k
ℓ )
TΦTℓ R¯k,ℓΦℓEkα
k,u¯k
ℓ
]
+ Ek
[
u¯TkRk,ku¯k
]
+ Ek
[
(αk,u¯kN )
TGkα
k,u¯k
N
]
+ (Ekα
k,u¯k
N )
T G¯kEkα
k,u¯k
N
}
= 2λEk
{N−1∑
ℓ=k
[(
Qk,ℓX
k,Φ
ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ Rk,ℓ(ΦℓX
k,Φ
ℓ + v
t,x
ℓ ) + qk,ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ ρk,ℓ
)T
α
k,u¯k
ℓ
+
(
Q¯k,ℓEkX
k,Φ
ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ R¯k,ℓ(ΦℓEkX
k,Φ
ℓ + Ekv
t,x
ℓ )
)T
Ekα
k,u¯k
ℓ
]
+
[
Rk,k(ΦkX
k,Φ
k + v
t,x
k ) + ρk,k
]T
u¯k
+
[
GkX
k,Φ
N + FkX
t,x,∗
k + gk
]T
α
k,u¯k
N + (EkX
k,Φ
N )
T G¯kEkα
k,u¯k
N
}
+ λ2J˜(k, 0; u¯k). (A.1)
From (3.4) and (3.5), it follows that
Ek
{N−1∑
ℓ=k
[(
Qk,ℓX
k,Φ
ℓ + (Φℓ)
TRk,ℓ(ΦℓX
k,Φ
ℓ + v
t,x
ℓ ) + qk,ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ ρk,ℓ
)T
α
k,u¯k
ℓ
+
(
Q¯k,ℓEkX
k,Φ
ℓ + (Φℓ)
T R¯k,ℓ(ΦℓEkX
k,Φ
ℓ + Ekv
t,x
ℓ )
)T
Ekα
k,u¯k
ℓ
]
+
[
Rk,k(ΦkX
k,Φ
k + v
t,x
k ) + ρk,k
]T
u¯k +
[
GkX
k,Φ
N + FkX
t,x,∗
k + gk
]T
α
k,u¯k
N + (EkX
k,Φ
N )
T G¯kEkα
k,u¯k
N
}
=
N−1∑
ℓ=k
Ek
{[(
Qk,ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ Rk,ℓΦℓ
)
(Xk,Φℓ − EkX
k,Φ
ℓ ) + Φ
T
ℓ Rk,ℓ(v
t,x
ℓ − Ekv
t,x
ℓ )
+ (Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ)
T (EℓY
k,Φ
ℓ+1 − EkY
k,Φ
ℓ+1 ) +
p∑
i=1
(Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ)
T
(
Eℓ(Y
k,Φ
ℓ+1w
i
ℓ)− Ek(Y
k,Φ
ℓ+1w
i
ℓ)
)
− (Y k,Φℓ − EkY
k,Φ
ℓ )
]T
(αk,u¯kℓ − Ekα
k,u¯k
ℓ ) +
[(
Qk,ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ Rk,ℓΦℓ
)
EkX
k,Φ
ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ Rk,ℓEkv
t,x
ℓ + qk,ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ ρk,ℓ
+
p∑
i=1
(Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ)
T
Ek(Y
k,Φ
ℓ+1w
i
ℓ) + (Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦℓ)
T
EkY
k,Φ
ℓ+1 − EkY
k,Φ
ℓ
]T
Ekα
k,u¯k
ℓ
}
+
[
Rk,k(ΦkX
k,Φ
k + v
t,x
k ) + B
T
k,kEkY
k,Φ
k+1 +
p∑
i=1
(Dik,k)
T
Ek(Y
k,Φ
k+1w
i
k) + ρk,k
]T
u¯k
=
[
Rk,k(ΦkX
k,Φ
k + v
t,x
k ) + B
T
k,kEkY
k,Φ
k+1 +
p∑
i=1
(Dik,k)
T
Ek(Y
k,Φ
k+1w
i
k) + ρk,k
]T
u¯k.
From (A.1), we can complete the proof. 
B Proof of Lemma 3.3
By simple calculation, we have
EN−1Y
k,Φ
N = EN−1
[
GkX
k,Φ
N + G¯kEkX
k,Φ
N + FkX
t,x,∗
k + gk
]
= Gk(Ak,N−1 +Bk,N−1ΦN−1)X
k,Φ
N−1 +
[
Gk(A¯k,N−1 + B¯k,N−1ΦN−1)
+ G¯k(Ak,N−1 + Bk,N−1ΦN−1)
]
EkX
k,Φ
N−1 +GkBk,N−1ΓN−1X
t,x,∗
N−1
+
[
GkB¯k,N−1 + G¯kBk,N−1
]
ΓN−1EkX
t,x,∗
N−1 + GkBk,N−1v¯
t,x
N−1 + Gkfk,N−1 + FkX
t,x,∗
k + gk,
EkY
k,Φ
N = Gk(Ak,N−1 + Bk,N−1ΦN−1)EkX
k,Φ
N−1 + GkBk,N−1
(
ΓN−1EkX
t,x,∗
N−1 + v¯
t,x
N−1
)
+ Gkfk,N−1 + FkX
t,x,∗
k + gk,
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From (3.8), we have
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In the above, we apply the property v¯t,x ∈ l2(Tt;R
m). By deduction, we can get the desired result. 
C Proof of Theorem 3.5
i)⇒ii). Let (Φ, vt,x) be a mixed equilibrium solution of Problem (LQ)tx, which satisfies (3.6) and (3.7). By
simple calculation, we have
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Qk,ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ Rk,ℓΦℓ
)
(αk,u¯kℓ − Ekα
k,u¯k
ℓ )
+ (Ekα
k,u¯k
ℓ+1 )
TSk,ℓ+1Ekα
k,u¯k
ℓ+1 − (Ekα
k,u¯k
ℓ )
TSk,ℓEkα
k,u¯k
ℓ
+ (Ekα
k,u¯k
ℓ )
T
(
Qk,ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ Rk,ℓΦℓ
)
Ekα
k,u¯k
ℓ
]
+ Ek
[
u¯TkRk,ku¯k
]
= Ek
[
u¯TkOku¯k
]
= u¯TkOku¯k. (C.1)
From (3.7) and (C.1), it holds that
inf
u¯k∈L
2
F
(k;Rm)
J˜(k, 0; u¯k) = inf
u¯k∈L
2
F
(k;Rm)
[
u¯TkOku¯k
]
≥ 0,
which implies Ok  0. Then, (3.9) is solvable.
We now prove b) and c). Letting k = N − 1 in (3.6) and noting
EN−1Y
N−1,Φ
N = GN−1(AN−1,N−1 + BN−1,N−1ΦN−1)X
N−1,Φ
N−1 + GN−1BN−1,N−1v
t,x
N−1
+ GN−1fN−1,N−1 + FN−1X
t,x,∗
N−1 + gN−1, (C.2)
EN−1(Y
N−1,Φ
N w
i
N−1) = GN−1
p∑
j=1
δ
ij
k
[
(CjN−1,N−1 +D
j
N−1,N−1ΦN−1)X
N−1,Φ
N−1
+DjN−1,N−1v
t,x
N−1 + d
j
N−1,N−1
]
,
we have
0 = RN−1,N−1(ΦN−1X
t,x,∗
N−1 + v
t,x
N−1) + B
T
N−1,N−1EN−1Y
N−1,Φ
N
+
p∑
i=1
(DiN−1,N−1)
T
EN−1
(
Y
N−1,Φ
N w
i
N−1
)
+ ρN−1,N−1
=
[
RN−1,N−1 + B
T
N−1,N−1GN−1BN−1,N−1 +
p∑
i,j=1
δ
ij
N−1(D
i
N−1,N−1)
TGN−1D
j
N−1,N−1
]
×
(
ΦN−1X
t,x,∗
N−1 + v
t,x
N−1
)
+
[
BTN−1,N−1GN−1AN−1,N−1 +
p∑
i,j=1
δ
ij
N−1(D
i
N−1,N−1)
TGN−1C
j
N−1,N−1
+ BTN−1,N−1FN−1
]
X
t,x,∗
N−1 + B
T
N−1,N−1GN−1fN−1,N−1 +
p∑
i,j=1
δ
ij
N−1(D
i
N−1,N−1)
TGN−1d
j
N−1,N−1
+ BTN−1,N−1gN−1 + ρN−1,N−1
= ON−1
(
ΦN−1X
t,x,∗
N−1 + v
t,x
N−1
)
+ LN−1X
t,x,∗
N−1 + θN−1. (C.3)
Here, XN−1,ΦN−1 = X
t,x,∗
N−1 and
ON−1 = RN−1,N−1 + B
T
N−1,N−1GN−1BN−1,N−1 +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
N−1(D
i
N−1,N−1)
TGN−1D
j
N−1,N−1,
LN−1 = BTN−1,N−1GN−1AN−1,N−1 +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
N−1(D
i
N−1,N−1)
TGN−1C
j
N−1,N−1 + B
T
N−1,N−1FN−1,
θN−1 = BTN−1,N−1GN−1fN−1,N−1 +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
N−1(D
i
N−1,N−1)
TGN−1dN−1,N−1
+ BTN−1,N−1gN−1 + ρN−1,N−1.
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Note that (Φ, vt,x) is a mixed equilibrium solution and Xt,x,∗ is given in (2.8). As ΦN−1X
t,x,∗
N−1 + v
t,x
N−1
satisfies (C.3), it holds from Lemma 3.4 that (C.3) is equivalent to
LN−1X
t,x,∗
N−1 + θN−1 ∈ Ran
(
ON−1
)
, (C.4)
and for some ηN−1 ∈ Rm,
ΦN−1X
t,x,∗
N−1 + v
t,x
N−1 = −O
†
N−1LN−1X
t,x,∗
N−1 −O
†
N−1θN−1 +
(
I −O†N−1ON−1
)
ηN−1. (C.5)
Clearly, (C.5) is equivalent to
v
t,x
N−1 = −(O
†
N−1LN−1 +ΦN−1)X
t,x,∗
N−1 −O
†
N−1θN−1 +
(
I −O†N−1ON−1
)
ηN−1 (C.6)
for some ηN−1 ∈ Rm. If we replace v
t,x
N−1 of (C.6) by
v
t,x
N−1 = −(O
†
N−1LN−1 +ΦN−1)X
t,x,∗
N−1 −O
†
N−1θN−1, (C.7)
then the new pair (Φ, vt,x) with vt,xN−1 given in (C.7) can also serve as a mixed equilibrium solution. By
submitting the pair (ΦN−1, v
t,x
N−1) (with v
t,x
N−1 given in (C.7)), the equations in (C.3) are also satisfied.
Therefore, the vt,xN−1 (in (C.3)) is selected as
v
t,x
N−1 = −(O
†
N−1LN−1 +ΦN−1)X
t,x,∗
N−1 −O
†
N−1θN−1. (C.8)
Substituting this vt,xN−1 into Lemma 3.3, we have
Y
N−2,Φ
N−1 = SN−2,N−1X
N−2,Φ
N−1 + S¯N−2,N−1EN−2X
N−2,Φ
N−1 + TN−2,N−1X
t,x,∗
N−1
+ T¯N−2,N−1EN−2X
t,x,∗
N−1 + UN−2,N−1X
t,x,∗
N−2 + πN−2,N−1.
In this case, it holds that
EN−2Y
N−2,Φ
N−1 =
(
SN−2,N−1 + TN−2,N−1
)[
AN−2,N−2X
t,x,∗
N−2 + BN−2,N−2
(
ΦN−2X
t,x,∗
N−2 + v
t,x
N−2
)
+ fN−2,N−2
]
+ UN−2,N−1X
t,x,∗
N−2 + πN−2,N−1,
and
EN−2
(
Y
N−2,Φ
N−1 w
i
N−2
)
=
(
SN−2,N−1 + TN−2,N−1
) p∑
j=1
δ
ij
N−2
[
CjN−2,N−2X
t,x,∗
N−2
+DjN−2,N−2
(
ΦN−2X
t,x,∗
N−2 + v
t,x
N−2
)
+ djN−2,N−2
]
.
Therefore, we have
0 = RN−2,N−2(ΦN−2X
t,x,∗
N−2 + v
t,x
N−2) + B
T
N−2,N−2EN−2Y
N−2,Φ
N−1
+DTN−2,N−2EN−2
(
Y
N−2,Φ
N−1 wN−2
)
+ ρN−2,N−2
=
[
RN−2,N−2 + B
T
N−2,N−2
(
SN−2,N−1 + TN−2,N−1
)
BN−2,N−2
+
p∑
i,j=1
δ
ij
N−2(D
i
N−2,N−2)
T
(
SN−2,N−1 + TN−2,N−1
)
DjN−2,N−2
](
ΦN−2X
t,x,∗
N−2 + v
t,x
N−2
)
+
[
BTN−2,N−2
(
SN−2,N−1 + TN−2,N−1
)
AN−2,N−2
+
p∑
i,j=1
δ
ij
N−2(D
i
N−2,N−2)
T
(
SN−2,N−1 + TN−2,N−1
)
CjN−2,N−2 + B
T
N−2,N−2UN−2,N−1
]
X
t,x,∗
N−1
+ BTN−2,N−2
(
SN−2,N−1 + TN−2,N−1
)
fN−2,N−2
+p∑
i,j=1
δ
ij
N−2(D
i
N−2,N−2)
T
(
SN−2,N−1 + TN−2,N−1
)
d
j
N−2,N−2 + B
T
N−2,N−2πN−2,N−1 + ρN−2,N−2
= ON−2
(
ΦN−2X
t,x,∗
N−2 + v
t,x
N−2
)
+ LN−2X
t,x,∗
N−2 + θN−2, (C.9)
where XN−2,ΦN−2 = X
t,x,∗
N−2 and
ON−2 = RN−2,N−2 + BTN−2,N−2
(
SN−2,N−1 + TN−2,N−1
)
BN−2,N−2
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
N−2(D
i
N−2,N−2)
T
(
SN−2,N−1 + TN−2,N−1
)
DjN−2,N−2,
LN−2 = B
T
N−2,N−2
(
SN−2,N−1 + TN−2,N−1
)
AN−2,N−2
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
N−2(D
i
N−2,N−2)
T
(
SN−2,N−1 + TN−2,N−1
)
CjN−2,N−2 + B
T
N−2,N−2UN−2,N−1,
θN−2 = B
T
N−2,N−2
(
SN−2,N−1 + TN−2,N−1
)
fN−2,N−2 + B
T
N−2,N−2πN−2,N−1 + ρN−2,N−2
+
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
N−2(D
i
N−2,N−2)
T
(
SN−2,N−1 + TN−2,N−1
)
d
j
N−2,N−2.
The following argument is similar to that between (C.4) and (C.8). Note that (Φ, vt,x) is a mixed equilibrium
solution and Xt,x,∗ is given in (2.8). Because ΦN−2X
t,x,∗
N−2 + v
t,x
N−2 satisfies (C.9), we have from Lemma 3.4
that (C.9) is equivalent to
LN−2X
t,x,∗
N−2 + θN−2 ∈ Ran
(
ON−2
)
, (C.10)
and for some ηN−2 ∈ Rm,
ΦN−2X
t,x,∗
N−2 + v
t,x
N−2 = −O
†
N−2LN−2X
t,x,∗
N−2 −O
†
N−2θN−2 +
(
I −O†N−2ON−2
)
ηN−2,
or equivalently,
v
t,x
N−2 = −(O
†
N−2LN−2 +ΦN−2)X
t,x,∗
N−2 −O
†
N−2θN−2 +
(
I −O†N−2ON−2
)
ηN−2.
If we replace vt,xN−1, v
t,x
N−2 of (Φ, v
t,x) by (C.8) and
v
t,x
N−2 = −(O
†
N−2LN−2 +ΦN−2)X
t,x,∗
N−2 −O
†
N−2θN−2, (C.11)
then the new pair (Φ, vt,x) is also a mixed equilibrium solution.
By repeating the procedure between (C.2) and (C.11), we have the properties b) and c).
ii)⇒i). For k ∈ T, (C.1) and Ok  0, we have
inf
u¯k∈L
2
F
(k;Rm)
J˜(k, 0; u¯k) = inf
u¯k∈L
2
F
(k;Rm)
[
u¯TkOku¯k
]
≥ 0,
which implies (3.7). Furthermore, based on Lemma 3.4 and by reversing the procedure of i)⇒ii), we can
assert that (Φ, vt,x) with vt,x given in (3.12) is a mixed equilibrium solution of Problem (LQ)tx. 
D Proof of Theorem 3.12
i)⇔ii). Note that (3.17) is equivalent to O˜kO˜
†
k
(
L˜kX
t,x,∗
k + θ˜k
)
= L˜kX
t,x,∗
k + θ˜k, k ∈ Tt. Letting k = t and
taking different xs, we have O˜tO˜
†
t L˜t = L˜t, O˜tO˜
†
t θ˜t = θ˜t. Because for any (t, x) with t ∈ T and x ∈ l
2
F (t;R
n)
Problem (LQ)tx admits a linear feedback equilibrium strategy, we must have the solvability of (3.24)-(3.25).
Furthermore, from the solvability of (3.24)-(3.25), it is not hard to confirm the existence of a linear feedback
equilibrium strategy.
ii)⇒iii). Let Φ = {−O˜†kL˜k, k ∈ T}, v = {−O˜
†
kθ˜k, k ∈ T}. Then, for any (t, x) with t ∈ T and
x ∈ l2(t;Rn), (Φ, v)|Tt is a linear feedback equilibrium strategy.
iii)⇒iv). Let ψ = (Φ, v). Then, this ψ satisfies the property of iv).
iv)⇒ii). We adopt a backward procedure to prove ii). First, letting t = N − 1, then (2.1) reads as
J
(
N − 1, XN−1,x,∗N−1 ;ψN−1(X
N−1,ψ
N−1 )
)
≤ J
(
N − 1, XN−1,x,∗N−1 ;uN−1
)
, ∀uN−1 ∈ l
2
F(N − 1;R
m). (D.1)
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Noting XN−1,x,∗N−1 = X
N−1,ψ
N−1 = x, it follows that
J(N − 1, x;uN−1)
= xT
[
QN−1,N−1 +A
T
N−1,N−1GN−1AN−1,N−1 + 2A
T
N−1,N−1FN−1
+
p∑
i,j=1
(CiN−1,N−1)
TGN−1C
j
N−1,N−1
]
x+ 2
[
xT
(
ATN−1,N−1GN−1BN−1,N−1
+
p∑
i,j=1
(CiN−1,N−1)
TGN−1D
j
N−1,N−1 + F
T
N−1BN−1,N−1
)
+ fTN−1,N−1GN−1BN−1,N−1
+
p∑
i,j=1
(diN−1,N−1)
TGN−1D
j
N−1,N−1 + ρ
T
N−1,N−1 + g
T
N−1BN−1,N−1
]
uN−1
+ uTN−1
[
RN−1,N−1 + B
T
N−1,N−1GN−1BN−1,N−1 +
p∑
i,j=1
(DiN−1,N−1)
TGN−1D
j
N−1,N−1
]
uN−1
+ 2xT
[
qN−1,N−1 +A
T
N−1,N−1GN−1fN−1,N−1 +A
T
N−1,N−1gN−1
+
p∑
i,j=1
(CiN−1,N−1)
TGN−1d
j
N−1,N−1
]
+ fTN−1GN−1fN−1 + 2g
T
N−1fN−1,N−1 +
p∑
i,j=1
(diN−1)
TGN−1d
j
N−1
≥ J
(
N − 1, x;ψN−1(x)
)
> −∞.
The last inequality occurs because ψ ∈ FT. Based on a lemma in [20], we have
O˜N−1  0, O˜N−1O˜
†
N−1L˜N−1 = L˜N−1, O˜N−1O˜
†
N−1θ˜N−1 = θ˜N−1,
and for any uN−1 ∈ L2F(N − 1;R
m),
J(N − 1, x;uN−1)
= (O˜N−1uN−1 + L˜N−1x+ θ˜N−1)
T O˜†N−1(O˜N−1uN−1 + L˜N−1x+ θ˜N−1)
+ xTPN−1,N−1x+ 2x
T
[
− L˜TN−1O˜N−1θ˜N−1 + qN−1,N−1 +A
T
N−1,N−1GN−1fN−1,N−1
+
p∑
i,j=1
(CiN−1,N−1)
TGN−1d
j
N−1,N−1 +A
T
N−1,N−1gN−1
]
+ fTN−1GN−1fN−1
+
p∑
i,j=1
(diN−1)
TGN−1d
j
N−1 + 2g
T
N−1fN−1,N−1 − θ˜
T
N−1O˜N−1θ˜N−1
≥ J(N − 1, x; u˜N−1(x)), (D.2)
where
O˜N−1 = RN−1,N−1 + BTN−1,N−1GN−1BN−1,N−1 +
∑p
i,j=1(D
i
N−1,N−1)
TGN−1D
j
N−1,N−1,
L˜N−1 = BTN−1,N−1GN−1AN−1,N−1 +
∑p
i,j=1(D
i
N−1,N−1)
TGN−1C
j
N−1,N−1 + B
T
N−1,N−1FN−1,
θ˜N−1 = BTN−1,N−1GN−1fN−1,N−1 +
∑p
i,j=1(D
i
N−1,N−1)
TGN−1d
j
N−1,N−1 + ρN−1,N−1 + BN−1,N−1gN−1,
PN−1,N−1 = QN−1,N−1+A
T
N−1,N−1GN−1AN−1,N−1+
p∑
i,j=1
(CiN−1,N−1)
TGN−1C
j
N−1,N−1−L˜
T
N−1O˜
†
N−1L˜N−1,
and u˜N−1(x) = −O˜
†
N−1L˜N−1x − O˜
†
N−1θ˜N−1. From this and (D.1), (D.2), one can select ψN−1 as
(−O˜†N−1L˜N−1,−O˜
†
N−1θ˜N−1), i.e., ψN−1(x) = −O˜
†
N−1L˜N−1x− O˜
†
N−1θ˜N−1.
Assume we have obtained ψℓ = (Φ˜ℓ, v˜ℓ), ℓ ∈ Tk+1, namely, ψ(z) = Φ˜ℓz + v˜ℓ, with (Φℓ, v˜ℓ) ∈ Rm×n ×Rm.
Let us derive the expression of ψk. Now, consider Problem (LQ) for the initial pair (k, x). By adding to and
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subtracting three terms
N−1∑
ℓ=k+1
Ek
[(
X
k,uk,ψ
ℓ+1 − EkX
k,uk,ψ
ℓ+1
)T
Pk,ℓ+1
(
X
k,uk,ψ
ℓ+1 − EkX
k,uk,ψ
ℓ+1
)
−
(
X
k,uk,ψ
ℓ − EkX
k,uk,ψ
ℓ
)T
Pk,ℓ
(
X
k,uk,ψ
ℓ − EkX
k,uk,ψ
ℓ
)]
,
N−1∑
ℓ=k+1
[(
EkX
k,uk,ψ
ℓ+1
)T
Pk,ℓ+1EkX
k,uk,ψ
ℓ+1 −
(
EkX
k,uk,ψ
ℓ
)T
Pk,ℓEkX
k,uk,ψ
]
,
2
N−1∑
ℓ=k+1
Ek
[
σTk,ℓ+1X
k,uk,ψ
k,ℓ+1 − σ
T
k,ℓX
k,uk,ψ
ℓ
]
from J
(
k, x; (uk, (ψ ·X
k,uk,ψ)|Tk+1)
)
, we have
J
(
k, x; (uk, (ψ ·X
k,uk,ψ)|Tk+1)
)
= Ek
[
xTQk,kx+ u
T
kRk,kuk + 2q
T
k,kx+ 2ρ
T
k,kuk
]
+
N−1∑
ℓ=k+1
Ek
[
(Xk,uk,ψℓ − EkX
k,uk,ψ
ℓ )
T
(
Qk,ℓ + Φ˜
T
ℓ Rk,ℓΦ˜ℓ
+ (Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦ˜ℓ)
TPk,ℓ+1(Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦ˜ℓ) +
p∑
i,j=1
(Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦ˜ℓ)
TPk,ℓ+1(C
j
k,ℓ +D
j
k,ℓΦ˜ℓ)− Pk,ℓ
)
× (Xk,uk,ψℓ − EkX
k,uk,ψ
ℓ ) + (EkX
k,uk,ψ
ℓ )
T
(
Qk,ℓ + Φ˜
T
ℓ Rk,ℓΦ˜ℓ + (Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦ˜ℓ)
TPk,ℓ+1(Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦ˜ℓ)
+
p∑
i=1
(Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦ˜ℓ)
TPk,ℓ+1(C
j
k,ℓ +D
j
k,ℓΦ˜ℓ)− Pk,ℓ
)
EkX
k,uk,ψ
ℓ
+ 2
(
qk,ℓ + Φ˜
T
ℓ Rk,ℓv˜ℓ + Φ˜
T
ℓ ρk,ℓ +
p∑
i,j=1
(Cik,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦ˜ℓ)
TPk,ℓ+1(D
j
k,ℓv˜ℓ + d
j
k,ℓ)
+ (Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦ˜ℓ)
TPk,ℓ+1(Bk,ℓv˜k,ℓ + fk,ℓ) + (Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦ˜ℓ)
Tσk,ℓ+1 − σk,ℓ
)T
X
k,uk,ψ
ℓ
+ 2ρTk,ℓv˜ℓ + v˜
TRt,kv˜ℓ +
p∑
i=1
(Dit,kv˜ℓ + d
i
k,ℓ)
TPk,ℓ(D
j
k,ℓv˜ℓ + d
j
k,ℓ)
+ (Bt,kv˜ℓ + fk,ℓ)
TPk,ℓ+1(Bk,ℓv˜ℓ + fk,ℓ) + σ
T
k,ℓ+1(Bk,ℓv˜ℓ + fk,ℓ)
]
+ 2xTFTk EkX
k,uk,ψ
N + Ek
[
(Xk,uk,ψk+1 − EkX
k,uk,ψ
k+1 )
TPk,k+1(X
k,uk,ψ
k+1 − EkX
k,uk,ψ
k+1 )
]
+ (EkX
k,uk,ψ
k+1 )
TPk,k+1EkX
k,uk,ψ
k+1 + 2σ
T
k,k+1EkX
k,uk,ψ
k+1 .
Let 
Pk,ℓ = Qk,ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ Rk,ℓΦℓ + (Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ)
TPk,ℓ+1(Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ)
+
∑p
i,j=1(C
i
k,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ)
TPk,ℓ+1(C
j
k,ℓ +D
j
k,ℓΦℓ),
Pk,ℓ = Qk,ℓ +ΦTℓ Rk,ℓΦk,ℓ + (Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦk,ℓ)
TPk,ℓ+1(Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦℓ)
+
∑p
i,j=1(C
i
k,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ)
TPk,ℓ+1(C
j
k,ℓ +D
j
k,ℓΦℓ),
σk,ℓ = qk,ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ Rk,ℓvℓ +Φ
T
ℓ ρk,ℓ +
∑p
i=1(C
i
k,ℓ +D
i
k,ℓΦℓ)
TPk,ℓ+1(D
j
k,ℓvℓ + d
j
k,ℓ)
+ (Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓΦℓ)TPk,ℓ+1(Bk,ℓΦk,ℓ + fk,ℓ) + (Ak,ℓ + Bk,ℓvℓ)Tσk,ℓ+1,
Pk,N = Gk, Pk,N = Gk, σk,N = gk, ℓ ∈ Tk+1,
and
γk,k+1 =
N−1∑
ℓ=k+1
[
2ρTk,ℓvℓ + v
T
ℓ Rk,ℓvℓ +
p∑
i,j=1
(Dik,ℓvℓ + d
i
k,ℓ)
TPk,ℓ(D
j
k,ℓvℓ + d
j
k,ℓ)
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+ (Bk,ℓvℓ + fk,ℓ)
TPk,ℓ+1(Bk,ℓvℓ + fk,ℓ) + σ
T
k,ℓ+1(Bk,ℓvℓ + fk,ℓ)
]
+ Fk(Bk,N−1vN−1 + fk,N−1) + Fk(Ak,N−1 + Bk,N−1ΦN−1)(Bk,N−2vN−2 + fk,N−2)
+
N−3∑
ℓ=k
Fk(Ak,N−1 + Bk,N−1ΦN−1) · · · (Ak,ℓ+1 + Bk,ℓ+1Φℓ+1)(Bk,ℓvℓ + fk,ℓ)
+ Fk(Ak,N−1 + Bk,N−1ΦN−1) · · · (Ak,k+1 + Bk,k+1Φk+1)fk,k.
Then, it holds that
J
(
k, x; (uk, (ψ ·X
k,uk,ψ)|Tk+1)
)
= xT
[
Qk,k +A
T
k,kPk,k+1Ak,k +
p∑
i,j=1
(Cik,k)
TPk,k+1C
j
k,k + 2U˜
T
k+1Ak,k
]
x
+ uTk
[
Rk,k + B
T
k,kPk,k+1Bk,k +
p∑
i,j=1
(Dik,k)
TPk,k+1D
j
k,k
]
uk
+ 2xT
[
ATk,kPk,k+1Bk,k +
p∑
i,j=1
(Cik,k)
TPk,k+1D
j
k,k + U˜
T
k+1Bk,k
]
uk
+ 2uTk
[
ρk,k + B
T
k,kPk,k+1fk,k +
p∑
i,j=1
(Dik,k)
TPk,k+1d
j
k,k + B
T
k,kσk,k+1
]
+ 2xT
[
qk,k +A
T
k,kPk,k+1fk,k +
p∑
i,j=1
(Cik,k)
TPk,k+1d
j
k,k +A
T
k,kσk,k+1
]
+ fTk,kPk,k+1fk,k +
p∑
i,j=1
(dik,k)
TPk,k+1d
j
k,k + 2σ
T
k,k+1fk,k + γk,k+1
≥ J
(
k, x; (ψ ·Xk,ψ)|Tk
)
> −∞,
where U˜k+1 = (Ak,k+1+Bk,k+1Φk+1) · · · (Ak,N−1+Bk,N−1ΦN−1)Fk. Then, we have O˜k  0, O˜kO˜
†
kL˜k = L˜k,
O˜kO˜
†
kθ˜k = θ˜k, and
J
(
k, x; (uk, (ψ ·X
k,uk,ψ)|Tk+1)
)
≥ J
(
k, x; (u˜k(x), (ψ ·X
k,u˜k(x),ψ)|Tk+1)
)
, ∀uk ∈ l
2
F(k;R
m),
where 
O˜k = Rk,k + BTk,kPk,k+1Bk,k +
∑p
i,j=1(D
i
k,k)
TPk,k+1D
j
k,k,
L˜k = BTk,kPk,k+1Ak,k +
∑p
i,j=1(D
i
k,k)
TPk,k+1C
j
k,k,
θ˜k = BTk,kPk,k+1fk,k +
∑p
i,j=1(D
i
k,k)
TPk,k+1d
j
k,k + ρk,k + Bk,kσk,k+1,
and u˜k(x) = −O˜
†
kL˜kx−O˜
†
kθ˜k. Hence, ψk can be selected as (−O˜
†
kL˜k,−O˜
†
kθ˜k), i.e., ψk(x) = −O˜
†
kL˜kx−O˜
†
kθ˜k.
Furthermore, S˜k,ℓ = Pk,ℓ, S˜k,ℓ = Pk,ℓ, σk,ℓ = πk,ℓ, ℓ ∈ Tk+1, where (S˜k,ℓ, S˜k,ℓ, πk,ℓ) is given in (3.24) and
(3.25).
By the method of induction, we have the solvability of (3.24) (3.25), and {ψk = (−O˜
†
kL˜k,−O˜
†
kθ˜k), k ∈ T}
is a feedback equilibrium strategy, that is, ψk(x) = −O˜
†
kL˜kx− O˜
†
kθ˜k, k ∈ T. This completes the proof. 
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